• ANDRÉ du PISANITHE ongoing debate on the prospect of phosphate mining on the seabed off the Namibian coast can be approached from different perspectives. One such perspective is that of robust compliance with formal legal instruments, notably the regulatory framework of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to regulate the mining of marine minerals beyond national jurisdiction.
The ISA is an autonomous international body established under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the more recent 1994 agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
A second perspective, much in evidence, is that of strict compliance with the Constitution and state law. Proponents of this perspective point to Chapter 11 of the Constitution that deals with ‘Principles of State Policy’, as outlined in Article 95 sub-articles (a) – (l), and a provision of Article 96 (d) that affirms respect for international law and treaty obligations. In terms of state law, the Environmental Management Act (No. 7 of 2007), and the requirement that the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) requires mining licences to be submitted along with an environmental impact assessment (EIA) report, as well as an environmental plan, is clear.
A third perspective builds on the previous two, and proposes far greater engagement by social formations, independent marine scientists and ecologists, amongst others, in the actual monitoring of the environmental, economic and social impact of terrestrial mining.
While this third perspective is fairly new, it has gathered momentum globally as a consequence of the negative environmental, economic and social impact of the mining of marine minerals. This third perspective is often augmented by corporate governance mechanisms, such as those of stock exchanges and South Africa’s King III Code of Governance.
A fourth perspective that informs this brief contribution to the debate is that of the political economy of pervasive rent-seeking and how it links to forms of state capture. Following Hillman (2009:85) ‘A rent is a personal benefit for which there is no corresponding counterpart value of personal productive contribution’.
Rents may take diverse forms, not all of which are against the public good or damaging to the public interest. Thus, there may be ‘ego rents’ that refer to the ‘private enjoyment of prestige and power’, and even ‘negative rents’ where talented, public-spirited individuals earn much less in pursuing public service careers than they would earn in the private sector.
Where rents take the form that is damaging to the country and the common good, they may be extracted through diverse means, ranging from outright theft, to usufruct, to the enjoyment of the perks of office, to state capture for personal gain.
In our country, we have witnessed forms of state capture, mostly by predatory elites in the domains of public construction, the awarding of public tenders, urban and agricultural land and in parts of the mining and service sectors.
There is little evidence of systemic state capture, but there is evidence of partial state capture by predatory elites and their networked patrons. Such individuals inevitably belong to the upper classes of the post-colony, while some are members of, or have influence, within the dominant political formation.
The evidence seems to suggest that long periods of dominant-party rule have induced a cultural adaptation to rent-seeking. A long absence of credible political opposition and of a disengaged citizenry result in rent encrustation that undermines accountability, transparency and democratic governance itself – all elements of the Harambee Prosperity Plan (HPP).
The question for Namibians is: Will the proposed phosphate mining on the seabed become a pervasive form of rent-seeking by a few privileged economic entrepreneurs linked to their political patrons? Age does not seem to matter much in this equation. At the time of writing, the jury is still out on this question.
