Part 1. The Petroleum Amendment Bill and Constitutional Governance

Namibia Stands On the threshold of becoming an oil-producing country of real significance.

That promise has generated excitement, political urgency and understandable pressure to move quickly.

But speed is not the same thing as sound governance.

The present debate over the petroleum (exploration and production) amendment bill, currently before parliament, is not only about oil; it is about who will hold power over one of Namibia’s most important future sectors, under what law and with what safeguards.

At the centre of the current proposal is a major shift of authority towards the Office of the President and the Upstream Petroleum Unit.

The public has been told that this is necessary to improve coordination, reduce delays and help Namibia prepare for its oil.

Yet an equally important question has not been answered with sufficient clarity.

If the Upstream Petroleum Unit is already operating in practice, why is there such urgency to rush the legal entrenchment of this model?

This article does not argue against petroleum development, nor does it suggest the president should take no interest in a sector of this importance. The real concern is different.

Namibia should not formalise a far more centralised petroleum governance structure before parliament and the public have fully considered its constitutional, institutional and accountability consequences.

Put simply: before we pump oil, we must get the law right.

THE ISSUE IN PLAIN LANGUAGE

The proposed amendment bill would move important powers away from the ordinary ministerial and administrative structure and place them in the Presidency and in the Upstream Petroleum Unit situated there.

In practical terms, this means decisions about a sector with enormous revenue, as well as environmental and intergenerational consequences would be drawn closer to the highest political office in the country.

That matters because constitutions are not designed only for times when everyone agrees and everything goes well.

They are also designed for the day when decisions are controversial, when mistakes are made, when officials disagree or when the public needs to know who is answerable.

A sound constitutional system does not rely only on good intentions; it relies on clear lines of responsibility, shared oversight and institutions that can question one another.

Namibia’s Constitution is built on exactly that logic. It is founded on democracy, the rule of law and justice for all.

The president and Cabinet hold executive power (Article 27), but Cabinet also bears duties to direct, coordinate and supervise ministries (Article 40).

Ministers are individually accountable for the administration of their own ministries (Article 41).

The National Assembly holds legislative power and must act in the public interest (Article 44).

These are not technical details. They are the guardrails that prevent public power from becoming too concentrated in any single place.

WHY THE URGENCY IS DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY

The argument for haste would be easier to understand if Namibia were facing an institutional vacuum. But that is not the picture presented by public documents.

The Presidency’s own 2025/26 budget speech states that upstream oil and gas functions have already been moved into the Office of the President and that the new division would focus on promoting the sector, developing policy and reviewing the law.

Public reporting has also indicated that the upstream petroleum unit already has leadership appointments and budgetary support.

If that is so, then the key question is not whether petroleum governance should be improved.

It is why parliament is being pressed to move so rapidly in converting an existing administrative arrangement into a more deeply entrenched legal structure.

When a unit is already functioning, urgency becomes a weaker argument for rushed lawmaking – not a stronger one.

In fact, the existence of a functioning unit creates more room for proper public explanation, parliamentary scrutiny and constitutional reflection.
Public discourse increasingly reflects this concern.

The concern is not simply that the state is reorganising; governments do that all the time.

The concern is that the law appears to be following practice after the fact, while the public is still being asked to treat the matter as an emergency.

That is precisely the kind of moment when parliament should slow down, ask harder questions and insist on clarity before granting wider powers.

CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS AT STAKE

The constitutional concern is not abstract. It goes to the heart of an accountable government.

If real operational control over petroleum is shifted into the Presidency but ministers remain the public face of the sector in parliament, accountability can become blurred.

A minister may still have to answer questions in the National Assembly yet no longer hold the full operational authority that meaningful accountability requires. That is not healthy constitutional design.

Read the next part of this article in The Namibian next week.

– This article was made possible by support from the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF). The contents expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views and opinions of the HSF


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