JB TJIVIKUAANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES worldwide play a pivotal role in the prevention and investigation of corruption.
An effective anti-corruption agency is a gigantic strength in the fight against corruption where they are independent of the government and empowered to investigate allegations, they have the potential to hold even the most powerful people in society to account.
Admittedly, politics being the science of government plays a major role in every country’s governance system. Evidently, party politics in our country is polarised in the layman’s definition of the term. Even when political leaders are constrained by strict civil service regulations on personnel management, partisan politics tends to determine the appointment of non-political executive bureaucrats.
The power to appoint the director general and the deputy director general of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in Namibia is, by virtue of the powers vested in the president of the Republic by section 10(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2003 (as amended). These appointments are subject to the procedural requirements for such positions.
The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in an opinion piece (No 5, November 2001) on the Namibia Anti-Corruption bill, particularly on the appointment and removal of the head of an anti-corruption commission, explicitly states: “From the onset, the shape and independence of any agency and commission may well be determined by how the office holder is appointed or removed. If the appointing mechanism ensures consensus support for an appointee through parliament, rather than government, and an accountability mechanism exists outside the government (such as through a parliamentary select committee in which all major parties are represented), the space for abuse or non-partisan activities can be minimised.”
It continues: “It is therefore important that the appointment procedure is one which recognises that the task of the office holder is to maintain a check on the executive and, in particular, the political party in power. If the executive, or even the ruling party, were to have a free hand in making the appointment, there would be an immediate loss of effectiveness and public confidence. At best, appointees would risk being seen as hand-picked supporters who could be relied upon not to rock the boat. At worst, they would be seen as a party’s hatchet men.”
The IPPR article concludes: “It follows that the appointment procedure must be one which involves a broader cast of actors than those presently in power. The precise appointment procedure will vary from country to country but each should address the issue of whether the proposed mechanism sufficiently insulates the appointment process. It must be one which ensures that an independent person of integrity is appointed and that such a person is adequately protected while in office. Removal from office should never be at the discretion of the powers that be, but only in accordance with a prescribed and open procedure, and only on the grounds of incompetence or misbehaviour.”
Often legislative flaws give presidents or prime ministers too much control over the appointment of directors general of anti-corruption commissions. The president or prime minister (depending on the structure of the government) is the head of the executive and members of the executive can also succumb to temptation. This undoubtedly would place the president or prime minister in a precarious position of deciding whether or not to prosecute close political associates.
Effective law enforcement is essential to ensure that the corrupt are punished and to break the cycle of impunity, or freedom from punishment or loss. On that basis, the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia commits its citizens irrevocably and without compromise to the ethical values of democracy and integrity. The Constitution further commits the state to respecting its moral principles and to prosecuting transgressions of the legislation.
In summary, it’s vital that the executive operate with the utmost degree of fairness and integrity to maintain a reputation of objectivity and professionalism in the corruption agency. For this, they need to allow the ACC to be independent of government control and influence, and on the appointment of the director general and deputy director general. This would ensure that the appointing mechanism could garner consensus for an appointee through parliament, rather than by the president, and that the accountability mechanism which exists outside the government – such as a parliamentary select committee in which all major parties are represented – deal with the issue to curtail the space for abuse, corruption or non-partisan activities.
It would therefore be prudent to amend the Anti-Corruption Act No 8 of 2003 accordingly.
