Outcome Uncertain: Deconstructing The 2004 Swapo Extraordinary Congress

MOST local commentators saw the recent Swapo Extraordinary Congress as a defining moment in our recent political life.

Reasons advanced for this view, included among others: the nature of the contest with three candidates competing for the position of presidential candidate of the Party in the upcoming presidential elections; the transparent manner in which the election took place; the adherence to formal democratic procedure; the fact that the Congress signalled the beginning of the end of the Nujoma era and the fact that the Congress and its immediate aftermath did not bring conflict and division in the Party and the country. All of the above can indeed be considered to have set the Congress apart from previous congresses.Also, on this understanding, the 2004 Extraordinary Congress might in the fullness of time come to be regarded as a defining moment of the fault lines in our body politic.What these fault lines are, however, was less clear from local media and the spate of analyses that followed the events of the past weeks.Before offering an alternative view of the Extraordinary Congress and its potential implications for our politics, I wish to make a few general remarks to preface and locate the events of the past weeks in a wider context.DEFICIENCIESThe first is that political parties and their deliberative spaces (such as congresses) exhibit a massive (though, to be sure, a far from uniform) range of deficiencies.These deficiencies can be seen in many different terms: as contingent and unintended outcomes of intended actions which were readily seen as intelligible and perhaps, even as rational (for example, Hifikepunye Pohamba is too advanced in years, too uncharismatic, too lethargic to become President of the country); as failures in socialisation (a particular treacherous zone for most political parties), as failures in cultural reproduction or in political imagination (much in evidence at the Extraordinary Congress).While these deficiencies do not necessarily reflect causal disagreements or deep ideological divides in a party, they often reflect preferences in the allocation of blame and different claims to the idea of ensuring and perpetuating the hegemony of a party.In the end it was this concern, ensuring and perpetuating the monopolising legitimate authority of Swapo Party of Namibia, ensuring cultural reproduction and perpetuating the political imagination (or lack of it) of liberation politics and development (a much-abused word) as appropriated by the founding President and those who commit themselves blindly to his vision of the future, that conspired against the two other candidates.Pohamba, from this perspective, was rationally seen as the logical successor and torchbearer of the vision of President Nujoma.It is also important to remember that he pressed his claim to the presidency frequently enough in these terms.The absence of a high profile campaign actually worked in his favour.It reinforced the idea among participants that he was politically the logical successor to his mentor, that he would ensure continuity and stability, especially during the transition, and that he would pursue the vision and priorities of the incumbent.While such reasoning might have been anti-intellectual (as indeed I believe it was) it carried the day.ULTIMATELY ALL POLITICS ARE LOCALThe second general point that needs to be made is that of the three candidates, Pohamba, enjoyed the support of, and had access to, more influential local power brokers where it counts; the northern Oshiwambo-speaking regions of the country.This is particularly important, since the ability for the reciprocal assimilation of local elites is key to the maintenance of political stability.Moreover, the local community leaders and power brokers themselves seem to think of this trajectory in terms of its historical continuity.In northern Namibia (as distinct from urban Namibia) there is a widely-held perception that links the peasantry and the local community leaders, through traditional leaders, the Party and the church, to the dominant class and the political leaders of the former liberation period.Contemporary political life in post-independent Namibia, however, does not manifest itself in a clear structure of constituted classes, but rather acts as an instrument of a dominant class in formation.The Hamutenya campaign, in retrospect, was premised on the illusion of a coherent and politically active middle class augmented by a transformative youth, a coalition that would support technocratic leadership and innovation.The problem with this assumption was it ignored the role of local notables and rural communities.It also underestimated the corrosive power of patronage and the tactical alliances that have been entered into between the Party and the State, the economic elites, the traders, organised labour and the rural peasantry.Curiously it failed to recognise that Swapo is the main party of the peasantry.Hints of a future technocratic cabinet did not help either.This process of reciprocal assimilation is not a recent phenomenon, but dates back to the pre-independence period.It ensures cultural reproduction and makes for a particular political imagination that privileges the liberation struggle and the idea of the opportunity State.Pohamba, like President Nujoma, is seen to provide opportunities to local communities, for he would, in all likelihood, continue significant strands that came to characterise the conservative modernisation of his predecessor (Swapo may be a radical party.It is certainly not a revolutionary party).THE POLITICS OF THE BELLYThe third dimension that is in need of closer analysis, is the practice of the politics of the belly (a phrase and practice that goes beyond physical corpulence), to borrow a phrase from Jean-Francois Bayart.It is important to emphasise at the outset that the networks that sustain and feed ‘the politics of the belly’ are anchored in inequality and that such networks are themselves producers of inequality.There is consequently no inherent contradiction between the understanding of the State in terms of social stratification and the internal logic of the political entrepreneurs who engage in the politics of the belly.The point is that the politics of the belly and the networks that feed it capture, accumulate and partially redistribute wealth and power.As such they are integral to the quest for political hegemony.As soon as positions of power within the dominant party command access to social and economic resources, the logic of schism becomes stronger, carrying the risk of eventual political fragmentation.This may well be one of the compelling reasons why the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Deputy were unceremoniously removed during the week of the Extraordinary Congress.The realisation that a different person could determine the allocation of resources of power, translated into the fear that the principle of reciprocity – whether symbolic or concrete – institutionalised by the personalization of social and political relations within existing networks – could be under threat, militated against the idea of more enlightened leadership change.The issue is not just that of ensuring that the redistribution of wealth and other resources of power would continue, rather that the personal relationship on which redistribution depends (which is by definition highly non-egalitarian and hierarchical), would change, making it more likely for social groups to become less petrified and less acquiescent.The political repertoire would change.Development projects, such as the railway line that is currently under construction between Tsumeb and Oshikango on the Angolan border, would become more depersonalised and ordinary.This, in turn, could detract from the image of the President as the inventor and implementer of development.MORAL CULTUREThis brings us to the next issue, that of the moral culture within the governing party.Are there active repositories left which condemn (or have the potential to prevent) the excessive monopolisation and personalisation of power? Do ordinary members of the governing party nourish the idea of individual liberty, while at the same time, consider deep social injustice and poverty (such as what we have in our country) as morally and socially unacceptable? How principled is the loyalty and trust? Have Namibians of different political ilk appropriated the formal representations of democracy, without the substantive moral values such as tolerance, the right to differ and freedom of conscience, that render democracy meaningful? The need for democracy does not arise for like-minded people.If we all agreed on all things there would be no need for a democracy.The call for democracy only arises where in our collective ventures we recognise that there are and always will be differences of opinion.There is also no need for democracy where one group or party is determined to force the others into submitting to its will.In democracies differences are recognised and valued.The need for democracy only arises when it is essential for rules and procedures to be laid down specifying that we must all act in a common way.In this last respect, the 2004 Extraordinary Swapo Congress offered real hope, at least at the level of procedures and form.SOME IMPLICATIONSAgainst these observations, what implications could the politics and outcome of the Extraordinary Congress have for the future? Admittedly, this in a difficult, yet necessary question to ask.The implications are bound to be mixed.On the positive side, the party faithful had, what was for many, their first meaningful encounter with procedural democracy.The mere fact that more than one candidate contested for the position (irrespective of their ethnic background, age, and gender) holds potential for internalising the rules of the game more deeply in the future.Leadership contests might intensify at different levels within the Party.Notwithstanding widespread fears that the President to-be would be a clone of the present incumbent, the reality may be different.Pohamba may well wish to leave his own imprint on what is likely to be a one-term presidency.By extension, this could make for a stronger cabinet with more political latitude than hitherto.In the interests of unity and sound governance, the Pohamba cabinet might contain a few surprises.Even those who fell out of favour with the present President might be invited to join the new cabinet.Together, these factors could make for a stable and smooth transition.On the negative side, however, there may be concern that the new President might not grapple firmly enough with the development challenges that lie ahead, particularly those identified in Vision 2030.There might also be concern that the successor might not open up the future, but that he could fall back on patronage, populism and the past, failing to engage the past so as to open up the future.Much of this, however, would depend on the composition and competencies in cabinet, as well as on the future President’s relationship with President Nujoma who would stay on as president of the Party.The drivers of politics are greed, grievance and growth.How these are managed tends to determine the conflict vulnerability of a society.Namibia is in a transition, the outcome of which is uncertain.* Andre du Pisani teaches politics and philosophy at the University of Namibia (Unam). The views expressed in this article are his own.All of the above can indeed be considered to have set the Congress apart from previous congresses.Also, on this understanding, the 2004 Extraordinary Congress might in the fullness of time come to be regarded as a defining moment of the fault lines in our body politic.What these fault lines are, however, was less clear from local media and the spate of analyses that followed the events of the past weeks.Before offering an alternative view of the Extraordinary Congress and its potential implications for our politics, I wish to make a few general remarks to preface and locate the events of the past weeks in a wider context.DEFICIENCIESThe first is that political parties and their deliberative spaces (such as congresses) exhibit a massive (though, to be sure, a far from uniform) range of deficiencies.These deficiencies can be seen in many different terms: as contingent and unintended outcomes of intended actions which were readily seen as intelligible and perhaps, even as rational (for example, Hifikepunye Pohamba is too advanced in years, too uncharismatic, too lethargic to become President of the country); as failures in socialisation (a particular treacherous zone for most political parties), as failures in cultural reproduction or in political imagination (much in evidence at the Extraordinary Congress).While these deficiencies do not necessarily reflect causal disagreements or deep ideological divides in a party, they often reflect preferences in the allocation of blame and different claims to the idea of ensuring and perpetuating the hegemony of a party.In the end it was this concern, ensuring and perpetuating the monopolising legitimate authority of Swapo Party of Namibia, ensuring cultural reproduction and perpetuating the political imagination (or lack of it) of liberation politics and development (a much-abused word) as appropriated by the founding President and those who commit themselves blindly to his vision of the future, that conspired against the two other candidates.Pohamba, from this perspective, was rationally seen as the logical successor and torchbearer of the vision of President Nujoma.It is also important to remember that he pressed his claim to the presidency frequently enough in these terms.The absence of a high profile campaign actually worked in his favour.It reinforced the idea among participants that he was politically the logical successor to his mentor, that he would ensure continuity and stability, especially during the transition, and that he would pursue the vision and priorities of the incumbent.While such reasoning might have been anti-intellectual (as indeed I believe it was) it carried the day.ULTIMATELY ALL POLITICS ARE LOCALThe second general point that needs to be made is that of the three candidates, Pohamba, enjoyed the support of, and had access to, more influential local power brokers where it counts; the northern Oshiwambo-speaking regions of the country.This is particularly important, since the ability for the reciprocal assimilation of local elites is key to the maintenance of political stability.Moreover, the local community leaders and power brokers themselves seem to think of this trajectory in terms of its historical continuity.In northern Namibia (as distinct from urban Namibia) there is a widely-held perception that links the peasantry and the local community leaders, through traditional leaders, the Party and the church, to the dominant class and the political leaders of the former liberation period.Contemporary political life in post-independent Namibia, however, does not manifest itself in a clear structure of constituted classes, but rather acts as an instrument of a dominant class in formation.The Hamutenya campaign, in retrospect, was premised on the illusion of a coherent and politically active middle class augmented by a transformative youth, a coalition that would support technocratic leadership and innovation.The problem with this assumption was it ignored the role of local notables and rural communities.It also underestimated the corrosive power of patronage and the tactical alliances that have been entered into between the Party and the State, the economic elites, the traders, organised labour and the rural peasantry.Curiously it failed to recognise that Swapo is the main party of the peasantry.Hints of a future technocratic cabinet did not help either.This process of reciprocal assimilation is not a recent phenomenon, but dates back to the pre-independence period.It ensures cultural reproduction and makes for a particular political imagination that privileges the liberation struggle and the idea of the opportunity State.Pohamba, like President Nujoma, is seen to provide opportunities to local communities, for he would, in all likelihood, continue significant strands that came to characterise the conservative modernisation of his predecessor (Swapo may be a radical party.It is certainly not a revolutionary party).THE POLITICS OF THE BELLYThe third dimension that is in need of closer analysis, is the practice of the politics of the belly (a phrase and practice that goes beyond physical corpulence), to borrow a phrase from Jean-Francois Bayart.It is important to emphasise at the outset that the networks that sustain and feed ‘the politics of the belly’ are anchored in inequality and that such networks are themselves producers of inequality.There is consequently no inherent contradiction between the understanding of the State in terms of social stratification and the internal logic of the political entrepreneurs who engage in the politics of the belly.The point is that the politics of the belly and the networks that feed it capture, accumulate and partially redistribute wealth and power.As such they are integral to the quest for political hegemony.As soon as positions of power within the dominant party command access to social and economic resources, the logic of schism becomes stronger, carrying the risk of eventual political fragmentation.This may well be one of the compelling reasons why the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Deputy were unceremoniously removed during the week of the Extraordinary Congress.The realisation that a different person could determine the allocation of resources of power, translated into the fear that the principle of reciprocity – whether symbolic or concrete – institutionalised by the personalization of social and political relations within existing networks – could be under threat, militated against the idea of more enlightened leadership change.The issue is not just that of ensuring that the redistribution of wealth and other resources of power would continue, rather that the personal relationship on which redistribution depends (which is by definition highly non-egalitarian and hierarchical), would change, making it more likely for social groups to become less petrified and less acquiescent.The political repertoire would change.Development projects, such as the railway line that is currently under construction between Tsumeb and Oshikango on the Angolan border, would become more depersonalised and ordinary.This, in turn, could detract from the image of the President as the inventor and implementer of development.MORAL CULTUREThis brings us to the next issue, that of the moral culture within the governing party.Are there active repositories left which condemn (or have the potential to prevent) the excessive monopolisation and personalisation of power? Do ordinary members of the governing party nourish the idea of individual liberty, while at the same time, consider deep social injustice and poverty (such as what we have in our country) as morally and socially unacceptable? How principled is the loyalty and trust? Have Namibians of different political ilk appropriated the formal representations of democracy, without the substantive moral values such as tolerance, the right to differ and freedom of conscience, that render democracy meaningful? The need for democracy does not arise for like-minded people.If we all agreed on all things there would be no need for a democracy.The call for democracy only arises where in our collective ventures we recognise that there are and always will be differences of opinion.There is also no need for democracy where one group or party is determined to force the others into submitting to its will.In democracies differences are recognised and valued.The need for democracy only arises when it is essential for rules and procedures to be laid down specifying that we must all act in a common way.In this last respect, the 2004 Extraordinary Swapo Congress offered real hope, at least at the level of procedures and form.SOME IMPLICATIONSAgainst these observations, what implications could the politics and outcome of the Extraordinary Congress have for the future? Admittedly, this in a difficult, yet necessary question to ask.The implications are bound to be mixed.On the positive side, the party faithful had, what was for many, their first meaningful encounter with procedural democracy.The mere fact that more than one candidate contested for the position (irrespective of their ethnic background, age, and gender) holds potential for internalising the rules of the game more deeply in the future.Leadership contests might intensify at different levels within the Party.Notwithstanding widespread fears that the President to-be would be a clone of the present incumbent, the reality may be different.Pohamba may well wish to leave his own imprint on what is likely to be a one-term presidency.By extension, this could make for a stronger cabinet with more political latitude than hitherto.In the interests of unity and sound governance, the Pohamba cabinet might contain a few surprises.Even those who fell out of favour with the present President might be invited to join the new cabinet.Together, these factors could make for a stable and smooth transition.On the negative side, however, there may be concern that the new President might not grapple firmly enough with the development challenges that lie ahead, particularly those identified in Vision 2030.There might also be concern that the successor might not open up the future, but that he could fall back on patronage, populism and the past, failing to engage the past so as to open up the future.Much of this, however, would depend on the composition and competencies in cabinet, as well as on the future President’s relationship with President Nujoma who would stay on as president of the Party.The drivers of politics are greed, grievance and growth.How these are managed tends to determine the conflict vulnerability of a society.Namibia is in a transition, the outcome of which is uncertain.* Andre du Pisani teaches politics and philosophy at the University of Namibia (Unam). The views expressed in this article are his own.