Avoiding the Ghosts of Mass Housing Past

The presidential task force on land and housing, announced last year, has generated high expectations in the land and housing sector and among those who need secure land and housing.

But for it to succeed, we must be honest about what went wrong before, especially the painful lessons from the Mass Housing Development Programme (MHDP).

When it started, it promised to deliver 185 000 housing units with about 20 000 jobs to be created.

The programme didn’t stumble because the idea was bad, but because the execution wasn’t good enough to meet project and budget targets.

If we ignore those lessons, the new task force, which is mainly responsible for resource mobilisation, may end up going the same way.

The hope is that the task force will support the operationalising of the National Housing Policy of 2023, that is under the control of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development. 

ACCOUNTABILITY

One reason mass housing failed is that no one truly owned it. The programme had too many “homes”, from the ministry to the National Housing Enterprise, to regional councils and town councils.

Everyone had power, yet no one was truly accountable.

Without a solid legal mandate and a clear chain of command, it will face the same confusion that crippled mass housing.

Another major weakness was poor project management. Contractors were left to their own devices, with limited monitoring, so quality differed from one region to the next.

In some places, houses were completed but people could not move in because basic services weren’t ready.

Another example is the 362 units in Otjomuise Extension 10 that were built before sewerage and water connections were properly in place.

To avoid this, the new task force must run a central, well-coordinated project management system.

It must also ensure that budgeting is well coordinated between the central government and the local authorities. Standards must be uniform across all regions.

Mass housing was also derailed because of cost overruns. Houses that were supposed to cost around N$200 000 shot up to double or even triple that amount. Once costs got out of control, the treasury cut the funding.

That killed the momentum, leaving unfinished homes, idle plots and thousands of disappointed Namibians.

The programme also built houses that were far too expensive for the average Namibian it claimed to target.

Banks refused mortgages, and many units stood empty. This time, affordability must be a priority.

Housing solutions should be in line with what ordinary Namibians actually earn. This means looking at serviced plots, incremental building, lower-cost materials, and financiers who understand low-income clients.

If we ignore affordability again, we will repeat the same painful story.

Affordability shouldn’t come at the cost of quality. Hence there is a need to scale up the capacity of local authorities in the overall project management. 

Local authorities are the backbone of housing delivery.

They are responsible for water, sewerage, land allocation, and building approval. No national housing project can succeed if local authorities are not properly supported.

That means seconding technical experts and land administration specialists to town councils, improving engineering and planning capacity, and ensuring councils have the financial means to maintain serviced land after it is delivered.

Another lesson was that political pressure at the wrong time without capital can ruin good plans.

Mass housing was rushed. Some procurement processes were compromised. Political speeches were made before technical planning was done.

The new task force must resist the temptation to rush for quick wins. Housing delivery is a marathon, not a sprint. 

There’s also some confusion about how the new task force fits into existing housing policy structures. Namibia already has the National Housing Policy implementation steering committee and the Project Implementation Coordination and Management Support Unit though it is not yet operationalised. 

This proposed unit aligns with international best practices by establishing supporting government institutions to coordinate scaling up housing delivery through broad stakeholder collaboration. However, neither the president’s announcement nor the Swapo manifesto section on land and housing mentions this.

This raises concerns. We must avoid creating overlapping structures that might compete and continue to promote silo implementation of projects.

The task force should focus on hands-on delivery while policy guidance remains with existing institutions. Integration, not duplication, is the way forward.

FULL TRANSPARENCY

If the new task force wants public trust, it must embrace full transparency. Mass housing became secretive, and many failures only came to light when it was too late. Publishing monthly dashboards showing progress, spending, contractor performance, and delays would build trust and keep everyone accountable.

Namibia truly has a second chance. This Special Land and Housing Delivery Task Force could finally move the country towards real, large-scale housing delivery. But only if we learn from the past.

We cannot afford to repeat the same mistakes. The stakes are too high, and the need is too urgent.

If we want to deliver land and housing on scale this time, Namibia must get its house in order, literally.

• Daniel Abisai is a land and spatial sciences professional and researcher; daniel.abisai01@gmail.com

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