Whither Franco-African Relations After The Cannes Summit?

TWO weeks ago, Jacques Chirac “L’Africain” said au-revoir in Cannes to over 30 African heads of state at what was arguably his last Franco-African summit.

With that comes the end of an era in Franco-African relations, not only because of Chirac’s ambivalent engagement as an avid connoisseur and activist for Africa, but also because the Cannes summit represents possibly the last vestiges of the sulphurous “Francafrique” as we have come to know it. Paris enjoyed through its Francafrique policy a chasse gardee (private hunting ground) in Africa.So, the theme of that summit dealing with Africa’s place in the world was fitting and it potently brought to the fore the transformation of French-Africa policy which for many years had the “distinction” of being coordinated from the Elysee (Presidency).Such transformation is not without consequence and is evidently the process and product of two connected factors: first the geopolitical context epitomised by the end of the Cold War and concomitantly the unintended consequences of geo-economics which on its part explain the declining economic role of France in Africa.The Chinese with their open chequebook diplomacy have become important economic actors and play bonds of uncritical friendships with African leaders; the United States with its security doctrine (war against terror) and Tony Blair’s ethical Africa policy underlined by robust engagement with Africa’s problems are bringing into sharp focus the way France views its role in Africa.With the re-emergence of these powers, the three pillars of French success in Africa as the international relations scholar Christopher Clapham demonstrates, “people, money and force” have been substantially weakened.Increasingly, the dichotomy between Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone Africa has become blurred through this constellation of actors and France has also contributed (to its credit) to that through its expansion of the Franco-Africa summit to all African countries.The end of the Cold War led to a disproportionately high number of conflicts occurring in Africa despite its promise of opportunities.Such escalation hardened public opinion in France as well International Non-governmental Organisations against the perverse nature of the French Africa policy where Paris played the role of putschists in favour or against African governments.Even the defining speech of the late president Francois Mitterrand at la Baule in 1990 which called for good governance and democracy did not go far in socialising Africa’s political elites into born-again democrats because the deeply rooted networks of affinity between Paris and some Franco-African leaders such as Dennis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon took precedence over the substance of democracy.As such Paris has been very selective in terms of its criticism of authoritarian and undemocratic regimes based on such affinities.However, the failed French intervention through “operation turquoise” in Rwanda was cataclysmic in driving a certain degree of transformation.As a consequence, French-Africa policy changed its focus to development aid and the resolution of conflicts on the African continent.This fire-fighter role is not necessarily the result of some “benevolent hegemony” on the part of the Elysee, but could be explained through the way how France perceives and (re)constructs its identity in post-Cold War international relations.Three themes are prevalent in French foreign policy: a Gaullist republican tradition with its insistence on values of autonomy and sovereignty; 2) a notion of rank which is important for a major power with a seat at the United Nations Security Council and global interests.This notion imposes on France some form of pretension to leadership in the European Union, parity with other powers, the promotion of French as an international language and defence of its position as the major western power in Africa.Thirdly, the notion of France being imbued with a mission civilisatrice (civilising mission) (which is not without critics) has created a sense among French foreign policy elites and diplomats that there is a French conception of international values.Since France can no longer on its own influence the course of history and events in Africa, it has turned to use its soft power as a defender of multilateralism through summits and international organisations as preferred forums for international problem solving.The conclusions of the Franco-African summit which in the final analysis focused on the conflict in Darfur are illuminating.In addition to that, French humanitarian interventions in parts of the continent through the UN Security Council approval (at times belatedly), notably in Cote d’Ivoire and its presence through instrumentalising the European Union in the Democratic Republic of the Congo explain important evolutions in the French Africa policy.To conclude, the substance of the 24th Franco-African summit in Cannes will remain anecdotal, but certainly it will be remembered as a place at which France ultimately lost through the departure of Jacques Chirac one of the pillars of its success in Africa, people.For Africa, it is both a loss and an opportunity.* Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari is a PhD fellow at the University of Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne.Paris enjoyed through its Francafrique policy a chasse gardee (private hunting ground) in Africa.So, the theme of that summit dealing with Africa’s place in the world was fitting and it potently brought to the fore the transformation of French-Africa policy which for many years had the “distinction” of being coordinated from the Elysee (Presidency).Such transformation is not without consequence and is evidently the process and product of two connected factors: first the geopolitical context epitomised by the end of the Cold War and concomitantly the unintended consequences of geo-economics which on its part explain the declining economic role of France in Africa.The Chinese with their open chequebook diplomacy have become important economic actors and play bonds of uncritical friendships with African leaders; the United States with its security doctrine (war against terror) and Tony Blair’s ethical Africa policy underlined by robust engagement with Africa’s problems are bringing into sharp focus the way France views its role in Africa.With the re-emergence of these powers, the three pillars of French success in Africa as the international relations scholar Christopher Clapham demonstrates, “people, money and force” have been substantially weakened.Increasingly, the dichotomy between Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone Africa has become blurred through this constellation of actors and France has also contributed (to its credit) to that through its expansion of the Franco-Africa summit to all African countries.The end of the Cold War led to a disproportionately high number of conflicts occurring in Africa despite its promise of opportunities.Such escalation hardened public opinion in France as well International Non-governmental Organisations against the perverse nature of the French Africa policy where Paris played the role of putschists in favour or against African governments.Even the defining speech of the late president Francois Mitterrand at la Baule in 1990 which called for good governance and democracy did not go far in socialising Africa’s political elites into born-again democrats because the deeply rooted networks of affinity between Paris and some Franco-African leaders such as Dennis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon took precedence over the substance of democracy.As such Paris has been very selective in terms of its criticism of authoritarian and undemocratic regimes based on such affinities.However, the failed French intervention through “operation turquoise” in Rwanda was cataclysmic in driving a certain degree of transformation.As a consequence, French-Africa policy changed its focus to development aid and the resolution of conflicts on the African continent.This fire-fighter role is not necessarily the result of some “benevolent hegemony” on the part of the Elysee, but could be explained through the way how France perceives and (re)constructs its identity in post-Cold War international relations.Three themes are prevalent in French foreign policy: a Gaullist republican tradition with its insistence on values of autonomy and sovereignty; 2) a notion of rank which is important for a major power with a seat at the United Nations Security Council and global interests.This notion imposes on France some form of pretension to leadership in the European Union, parity with other powers, the promotion of French as an international language and defence of its position as the major western power in Africa.Thirdly, the notion of France being imbued with a mission civilisatrice (civilising mission) (which is not without critics) has created a sense among French foreign policy elites and diplomats that there is a French conception of international values.Since France can no longer on its own influence the course of history and events in Africa, it has turned to use its soft power as a defender of multilateralism through summits and international organisations as preferred forums for international problem solving.The conclusions of the Franco-African summit which in the final analysis focused on the conflict in Darfur are illuminating.In addition to that, French humanitarian interventions in parts of the continent through the UN Security Council approval (at times belatedly), notably in Cote d’Ivoire and its presence through instrumentalising the European Union in the Democratic Republic of the Congo explain important evolutions in the French Africa policy.To conclude, the substance of the 24th Franco-African summit in Cannes will remain anecdotal, but certainly it will be remembered as a place at which France ultimately lost through the departure of Jacques Chirac one of the pillars of its success in Africa, people.For Africa, it is both a loss and an opportunity.* Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari is a PhD fellow at the University of Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne.