What’s new about China in Africa?

DESPITE some reservations bordering on xenophobia, China is not a newcomer to Africa. The question is more so, what is new about China in Africa? The offensive pursued by the East Asian tiger has resulted in a wave of strong responses, ranging from welcoming applause for an anti-imperialist new partner to radical criticism of a new imperialist agent.

Fact is that Chinese companies and people expand aggressively into African markets and seek access to the fossil energy resources and other minerals and metals the country needs to fuel its rapid industrialisation process as the most eminent emerging economy. This represents a shift towards a new multilateral rivalry when it comes to securing the wealth of natural resources on the African continent (including land). At the same time, the Chinese production of cheap manufactured commodities looks for new markets, which rely on the expansion into hitherto eterra incognita (unknown territory). But the African continent is not as strange to China as some might assume.This new stage of competing forces has resulted in a plethora of recent analyses dealing mainly if not exclusively with the Chinese impact. There is indeed a lot of dubious business going on under the flag of friendship, which ought to be criticised and demystified. Such analyses should be even-handed when it comes to the pursuance of external interests in the name of so-called progress (with the guiding question: progress for whom?). Interestingly enough, however, the EU and US-policies and practices seem to get at times far less prominent attention in the public sphere. Namibia fs resistance to the imposition of Interim Economic Partnership Agreements clearly not to the advantage of her own national economic interests is a rare exception, which draws attention to the new trade offensive from Brussels to once again consolidate further the European dominance. In contrast, the current type of Cassandra prophecies concerning China’s role presents a rather one-sided story. Selective narratives tend to downplay the damaging external effects, which the existing socio-economic imbalances and power structures have created and consolidated since long – in actual fact, since the days of the slave trade, which like the subsequent colonial period has been entirely an affair of the Western world. Keeping this legacy in mind, the often far too one-sided criticism of Chinese expansion is more so an indicator of an increasing fear in the established imperialist centres to lose out than for being motivated by a genuine concern for the African people. This, however, is no argument for letting the Chinese off the hook. No new kid on the blocEver since the Bandung Conference in 1954, Chinese foreign policy included ambitions for a hegemonic role in the South as part of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and competition. It pursued a pro-active, interventionist policy with regard to African countries in its support to liberation movements and governments in newly independent states. This expansionist policy under the flag of anti-imperialism was at times guided by disastrous misjudgments and resulted in not only financially costly adventures under the chairman Mao, but came also at the expense of human lives. Just remember that it was Unita, which received material support from China at a time, when it collaborated with the South African Apartheid regime to overthrow the MPLA government. Friendly relations with Namibia manifested itself originally in the mid-1960s through Swanu, not Swapo. And in South Africa the PAC, not the ANC, has been the blue-eyed boy.More recently, since Chinese foreign policy displayed an even more active (though preferably still low profile) policy of going abroad, such misjudgments are generously overlooked. What counts more is that Beijing has always taken sides with those fighting against colonial rule and other forms of foreign domination. This makes China in the eyes of the world – or at least in the eyes of those fighting against foreign domination – a steadfast supporter of the global anti-imperialist struggle even at times when it turns herself into a formidable (neo-)imperialist force. The aid architecture, which emerged with the independent states as a programmatically defined commitment during the 1960s, has been through a variety of changes since then. Despite continuous South-South collaboration dating back to the already mentioned Bandung conference and notwithstanding the socialist internationalism it had always been perceived as a Western approach to assist the African countries in a process termed development. It is often overlooked that China had its share in supporting African governments in their aspirations towards more sovereignty and development not only by her rhetoric but also in practical terms. One of the single biggest and most ambitious infrastructural projects of the mid-1970s was the Tazara railway, connecting the Zambian copper belt with the port of Dar-es-Salaam. Western donors considered this as a megalomaniac affair, which China would not be able to pull off. It indeed proved to be difficult to get into operation and – more difficult even – to maintain it operational. At the virtue of collapse, it has since then be revamped and remains an asset. Instead of making China a laughing stock, it became a project considered to be of exemplary support for further economic cooperation and self-reliance between two neighbouring countries. It shaped as much the positive image among African governments towards Chinese collaboration as the plethora of public buildings such as state houses and other representative monuments of government power, often under a dominant party in political control. Maybe even more importantly did the sports arenas (in the main football stadiums), which the Chinese built over decades as a token of friendship, impact on public perceptions. The World Social Forum, which took place in Nairobi in January 2007, had a Chinese-built stadium as the venue. Not that this positive image would protect the current Chinese onslaught from critical repercussions, mainly from ordinary people affected in their daily struggle for survival by the new competition from abroad. After al, the Chinese expansion has added a hitherto unknown physical dimension to external interests pursued on the continent since Independence. Ordinary African people in their struggle for survival have to compete with Chinese, who also seek to occupy the pavements and backyards for small business, thereby threatening the meagre subsistence of local hawkers and traders. Challenges for new cooperationMore than half a century into decolonisation, China had established a track record, which made her in African eyes (at least in the eyes of those holding power in Africa) anything but a new kid on the bloc. It can build on decades of friendly relations established with governments and individual leaders, if not with the ordinary people. This shifts some degree of attention also on the role of these elites, doing business as political leaders and as higher-ranking public servants (not always serving the public interest) with the not so new kid(s) on the bloc.With China and other new powerful actors (such as India, Brazil, Russia and some other so-called emerging economies) joining and challenging the earlier established network of external relations between African countries and the rest of the world, one needs to re-visit the aid and development paradigms to see if and how they change or how the changing economic relationships impact on defined priorities as well as potential collaboration among old and new donor countries seeking not necessarily to support Africa’s progress but in the first place pursuing their own interests.Several fundamentals of the current aid paradigm and policies are under scrutiny when taking into consideration the econstructive engagement f of China and some of the other new players in Africa. These include among others the following essentials:- the role played by multilateralism versus bilateral relations among states;- the balance between collective responsibility and national sovereignty;- the prominence and preference given to either hard (infrastructural) or soft (good governance and institutional capacity building) priorities.These areas touch upon earlier debates dating back to the days of the developmental state policy of the 1970s. The official notion propagated then (largely by governments accountable mainly to themselves) had demanded development first, human rights and democracy later. It contrasted with the later established, post-Cold War era understanding that there is no sustainable development without institutionalised democratic norms and the entrenchment of human rights and their corresponding values. It remains to be seen, if the proponents of the two views find a way to shift towards convergence of the priorities in one coherent framework, which gives sufficient recognition and space for implementing both approaches in a complementing fashion to induce and promote sustainable development for the benefit of a majority of the people in the countries. Put differently the question is if the external stakeholders move back into geopolitics reminiscent of the earlier Cold War period or if the ground is laid for more Realpolitik seeking benefits for all stakeholders, not least the hitherto marginalised at the receiving end. The Chinese track record emerging is not an indicator for a new trajectory, which would benefit the majority of the African people. More so, the Chinese foreign policy gospel of non-interference is an attractive tune for the autocratic leaders and oligarchies still in power, be it in Angola, the People’s Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the Sudan, Zimbabwe or similar societies still run to a large extent like private property of cliques. Double standards and differences between official rhetoric and practical action are not so different from those who demand democracy elsewhere only when it suits their other interests and remain generously passive on human rights violations when these are committed by ‘friendly’ regimes or those countries in which vested economic interests dominate the relations. In that sense, there is not so much new about China in Africa. Rather, it seems often too much of the same.This places at the end the ultimate responsibility once again upon those who claim to represent the people of their countries. Do they enter business with China or for that matter any other external agency for the best of the country and its people or are they driven by their own individual interests and gains? The verdict is out. It should focus on the local elites, who should be judged against the criteria, in whose interest they really act. Even as junior partners they hold some influence over what is on and what is not, as the recent principled stance of Namibia versus the European giant documents with regard to the refusal to sign up to a so-called Economic Partnership Agreement, which casts doubts over the true meaning of its title.* Henning Melber is the Executive Director of The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala/Sweden. He has been director of NEPRU between 1992 and 2000.