Lessons From A Tragic Democratic Comedy In Côte d’Ivoire

The involvement of the United Nations was to provide a modicum of legitimacy and competence.

In line with the Constitutional provisions concerning the role of the Constitutional Council, including the revisions made with regard to electoral matters in 2008, the latter institution has to validate the results. In the event of the Constitutional Council expressing reservations or anomalies with regard to the results on the basis of expressed concerns by one of the parties to the elections, it has the power to declare the elections null and void. Such powers do not in any way relate to the Constitutional Council being the final arbiter as to which party or individual won the elections. Contrary to its mandate and role, the Constitutional Council declared Gbagbo the winner of the presidential elections after having allegedly annulled thousands of votes in favour of Ouattara. Côte d’Ivoire has now effectively been for over a month a country of two presidents – one recognised by the international community and the other relying on incumbency and the ‘national army’, including suspected mercenaries, to remain in place. In short, it is a war economy with inflation reaching catastrophic levels.Be that as it may, there are two lessons for Africa in this matter. First, Africa should realize that there are limits to the diplomatic lesson and effort when dealing with conflicts of this nature. In the normal course of diplomacy, a month would not constitute a long time in the search for a multilateral and diplomatic solution to the impasse. However, all indications are that Laurent Gbagbo is on a charm offensive, trying to buy more time and win perhaps a few friends. In fact, he appears to be taking advantage of divisions with regard to the limits of available options to dislodge him. Despite the isolation and the sanctions imposed on his entourage, Gbagbo is increasingly leaving the international community with less and less options when it comes to getting him out of the presidential palace in Cocody. Therefore, the longer it takes for the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to agree on options, the more difficult it becomes for these institutions to convince Gbagbo to leave power through a diplomatic solution. As long as Gbagbo, (who by all accounts has taken a zero-sum view of the political impasse) remains firmly in place, a certain degree of flawed legitimacy would take root with disastrous consequences for the democratisation process in Africa. The point I seek to emphasise here is that these institutions must mature to a point where the threat of the use of force or the use of force tout court becomes institutionalised as a viable option when it comes major violations of democratic processes. Evidently, the use of force to remove an individual from power occupied illegitimately may appear premature. Similarly, it includes potential risks when it comes to the loss of life. However, it could provide significant long-term benefits for Africa’s democratisation process. Second, Africa should take an active interest in both the institutional and normative aspects of democracy. Essentially, what this entail sin practice is that the commitment to democracy must not only be rooted in creating institutions dedicated to the legitimisation of power, but there must be also be an intrinsic commitment to deepening democratic traditions in these institutions. Furthermore, Africa must try and perfect the imperfect condition of living in democracies. Failure to do so will simply put African states in a state of crisis management in flawed democracies as the situations in Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and now Côte d’Ivoire reveal. * Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari is a PhD fellow in political science at the University of Paris-Panthéon Sorbonne, France.