Africa Must Craft A Neo-colonial Trajectory In Its Relations With China

THE Father of Kenya’s Independence, Jomo Kenyatta had the following to say about the economic exploitation of Africa: ‘When the white man came, we had land and they had the Bible. They taught us to pray with closed eyes.

When we opened our eyes, the whites had our land and we had the Bible.’Almost 20 years after the end of the cold war, Africa has now achieved political independence. While the nineties were a lost decade with the continent ravaged by internal conflicts, the continent seems to be moving a different political trajectory. With the relative peace that characterises much of the continent with the exception of Darfur, Somalia, Chad and a few low-intensity conflicts, Africa appears set to be an interesting frontier. However, Africa is a frontier because of its wealth in natural resources, which by and large were also the source of its instability for decades. Africa has 10 per cent of the world’s oil-reserves; 90 per cent of proven reserves of platinum, cobalt and chrome; 60 per cent of manganese; 40 per cent of gold, 30 per cent of bauxite and uranium. These natural resources are indispensable for the growth of new technologies and the overall economic growth of industrialised and emerging powers. As a consequence, Africa is again the terrain of new geo-strategic and geo-economic competition on the part of major powers, including the People’s Republic of China. China has a unique place in Africa’s anti-colonial imagination and deserves particular mention, because it has been on the side of Africa in the geopolitical contest during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, and its own capitalist economic demands, China has sought to use or rather turn its political capital into tangible and pragmatic economic gains. To attest to the importance it attaches to Africa, China has initiated a number of strategic initiatives in order to consolidate its political and economic position in Africa. These include the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), including the launch of a China Africa Policy in 2006. It is now also active in UN led African peacekeeping operations. Alongside these political and ethical initiatives, exists a hosts of other economic instruments in the form of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including the EXIM Bank, and a development fund consisting by the end of this year of US$5 billion At the end of this decade, China would exponentially have been the most important single investor in Africa. China owns 20 per cent of Africa’s biggest bank, Standard Bank. The PRC lent US$5 billion to the Democratic Republic of the Congo: US$3 billion of this amount would be used to construct 32 000 km of roads, 31 hospitals and 5 000 houses for the poor. The remaining US$2 billion is to be used for partnerships in mining. Similar initiatives and offers have been made and are in use in various African countries. Yet, what is worrying about these new partnerships is the fact that the ‘new debt’ will not be repaid by the treasuries in dollars, but it will be repaid in kind. In short, the DRC will have to repay its debt by giving ownership of natural resources to the PRC. Certainly, the Chinese deals provide us with needed massive funds in the short-term to rebuild our infrastructure, but they also present in the long-term a policy challenge for Africans. The caveat I seek to underscore here is exactly the same as that posed by Kenyatta, perhaps not in the crude manner in which he did. African leaders and policy makers must guard against surrendering the strategic interests of their respective countries for the short-term. While it is necessary to build schools, hospitals and important infrastructure, these should not be at the expense of African ownership of strategic resources and industries. Africa’s under-development is in part a consequence of the lack of ownership of its wealth in natural resources, which was prevalent under colonialism. Important lessons ought to have been drawn from the looting at the hands of European colonialism. Thus, I don’t believe that we are thinking hard about China’s strategic thinking with regard to Africa. The challenge then is that nascent policies in African capitals that seek to engage China must reflect these strategic considerations, both on China’s part and importantly our own. Importantly, when framing this important relationship, the historical colonial lesson ought to have been learned. * Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari is a PhD fellow in political science at the University of Paris- Panthéon Sorbonne, France