Outcome Uncertain: Deconstructing The 2004 Swapo Extraordinary Congress
By: Andre du PisaniMOST local commentators saw the recent Swapo Extraordinary Congress as a defining moment in our recent political life.
Reasons advanced for this view, included among others: the nature
of the contest with three candidates competing for the position of
presidential candidate of the Party in the upcoming presidential
elections; the transparent manner in which the election took place;
the adherence to formal democratic procedure; the fact that the
Congress signalled the beginning of the end of the Nujoma era and
the fact that the Congress and its immediate aftermath did not
bring conflict and division in the Party and the country.
All of the above can indeed be considered to have set the
Congress apart from previous congresses.
Also, on this understanding, the 2004 Extraordinary Congress
might in the fullness of time come to be regarded as a defining
moment of the fault lines in our body politic.
What these fault lines are, however, was less clear from local
media and the spate of analyses that followed the events of the
past weeks.
Before offering an alternative view of the Extraordinary
Congress and its potential implications for our politics, I wish to
make a few general remarks to preface and locate the events of the
past weeks in a wider context.
DEFICIENCIES
The first is that political parties and their deliberative
spaces (such as congresses) exhibit a massive (though, to be sure,
a far from uniform) range of deficiencies.
These deficiencies can be seen in many different terms: as
contingent and unintended outcomes of intended actions which were
readily seen as intelligible and perhaps, even as rational (for
example, Hifikepunye Pohamba is too advanced in years, too
uncharismatic, too lethargic to become President of the country);
as failures in socialisation (a particular treacherous zone for
most political parties), as failures in cultural reproduction or in
political imagination (much in evidence at the Extraordinary
Congress).
While these deficiencies do not necessarily reflect causal
disagreements or deep ideological divides in a party, they often
reflect preferences in the allocation of blame and different claims
to the idea of ensuring and perpetuating the hegemony of a
party.
In the end it was this concern, ensuring and perpetuating the
monopolising legitimate authority of Swapo Party of Namibia,
ensuring cultural reproduction and perpetuating the political
imagination (or lack of it) of liberation politics and development
(a much-abused word) as appropriated by the founding President and
those who commit themselves blindly to his vision of the future,
that conspired against the two other candidates.
Pohamba, from this perspective, was rationally seen as the
logical successor and torchbearer of the vision of President
Nujoma.
It is also important to remember that he pressed his claim to
the presidency frequently enough in these terms.
The absence of a high profile campaign actually worked in his
favour.
It reinforced the idea among participants that he was
politically the logical successor to his mentor, that he would
ensure continuity and stability, especially during the transition,
and that he would pursue the vision and priorities of the
incumbent.
While such reasoning might have been anti-intellectual (as
indeed I believe it was) it carried the day.
ULTIMATELY ALL POLITICS ARE LOCAL
The second general point that needs to be made is that of the
three candidates, Pohamba, enjoyed the support of, and had access
to, more influential local power brokers where it counts; the
northern Oshiwambo-speaking regions of the country.
This is particularly important, since the ability for the
reciprocal assimilation of local elites is key to the maintenance
of political stability.
Moreover, the local community leaders and power brokers
themselves seem to think of this trajectory in terms of its
historical continuity.
In northern Namibia (as distinct from urban Namibia) there is a
widely-held perception that links the peasantry and the local
community leaders, through traditional leaders, the Party and the
church, to the dominant class and the political leaders of the
former liberation period.
Contemporary political life in post-independent Namibia,
however, does not manifest itself in a clear structure of
constituted classes, but rather acts as an instrument of a dominant
class in formation.
The Hamutenya campaign, in retrospect, was premised on the
illusion of a coherent and politically active middle class
augmented by a transformative youth, a coalition that would support
technocratic leadership and innovation.
The problem with this assumption was it ignored the role of
local notables and rural communities.
It also underestimated the corrosive power of patronage and the
tactical alliances that have been entered into between the Party
and the State, the economic elites, the traders, organised labour
and the rural peasantry.
Curiously it failed to recognise that Swapo is the main party of
the peasantry.
Hints of a future technocratic cabinet did not help either.
This process of reciprocal assimilation is not a recent
phenomenon, but dates back to the pre-independence period.
It ensures cultural reproduction and makes for a particular
political imagination that privileges the liberation struggle and
the idea of the opportunity State.
Pohamba, like President Nujoma, is seen to provide opportunities
to local communities, for he would, in all likelihood, continue
significant strands that came to characterise the conservative
modernisation of his predecessor (Swapo may be a radical party.
It is certainly not a revolutionary party).
THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY
The third dimension that is in need of closer analysis, is the
practice of the politics of the belly (a phrase and practice that
goes beyond physical corpulence), to borrow a phrase from
Jean-Francois Bayart.
It is important to emphasise at the outset that the networks
that sustain and feed 'the politics of the belly' are anchored in
inequality and that such networks are themselves producers of
inequality.
There is consequently no inherent contradiction between the
understanding of the State in terms of social stratification and
the internal logic of the political entrepreneurs who engage in the
politics of the belly.
The point is that the politics of the belly and the networks
that feed it capture, accumulate and partially redistribute wealth
and power.
As such they are integral to the quest for political
hegemony.
As soon as positions of power within the dominant party command
access to social and economic resources, the logic of schism
becomes stronger, carrying the risk of eventual political
fragmentation.
This may well be one of the compelling reasons why the former
Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Deputy were unceremoniously
removed during the week of the Extraordinary Congress.
The realisation that a different person could determine the
allocation of resources of power, translated into the fear that the
principle of reciprocity - whether symbolic or concrete -
institutionalised by the personalization of social and political
relations within existing networks - could be under threat,
militated against the idea of more enlightened leadership
change.
The issue is not just that of ensuring that the redistribution
of wealth and other resources of power would continue, rather that
the personal relationship on which redistribution depends (which is
by definition highly non-egalitarian and hierarchical), would
change, making it more likely for social groups to become less
petrified and less acquiescent.
The political repertoire would change.
Development projects, such as the railway line that is currently
under construction between Tsumeb and Oshikango on the Angolan
border, would become more depersonalised and ordinary.
This, in turn, could detract from the image of the President as
the inventor and implementer of development.
MORAL CULTURE
This brings us to the next issue, that of the moral culture
within the governing party.
Are there active repositories left which condemn (or have the
potential to prevent) the excessive monopolisation and
personalisation of power? Do ordinary members of the governing
party nourish the idea of individual liberty, while at the same
time, consider deep social injustice and poverty (such as what we
have in our country) as morally and socially unacceptable? How
principled is the loyalty and trust? Have Namibians of different
political ilk appropriated the formal representations of democracy,
without the substantive moral values such as tolerance, the right
to differ and freedom of conscience, that render democracy
meaningful? The need for democracy does not arise for like-minded
people.
If we all agreed on all things there would be no need for a
democracy.
The call for democracy only arises where in our collective
ventures we recognise that there are and always will be differences
of opinion.
There is also no need for democracy where one group or party is
determined to force the others into submitting to its will.
In democracies differences are recognised and valued.
The need for democracy only arises when it is essential for
rules and procedures to be laid down specifying that we must all
act in a common way.
In this last respect, the 2004 Extraordinary Swapo Congress
offered real hope, at least at the level of procedures and
form.
SOME IMPLICATIONS
Against these observations, what implications could the politics
and outcome of the Extraordinary Congress have for the future?
Admittedly, this in a difficult, yet necessary question to ask.
The implications are bound to be mixed.
On the positive side, the party faithful had, what was for many,
their first meaningful encounter with procedural democracy.
The mere fact that more than one candidate contested for the
position (irrespective of their ethnic background, age, and gender)
holds potential for internalising the rules of the game more deeply
in the future.
Leadership contests might intensify at different levels within
the Party.
Notwithstanding widespread fears that the President to-be would
be a clone of the present incumbent, the reality may be
different.
Pohamba may well wish to leave his own imprint on what is likely
to be a one-term presidency.
By extension, this could make for a stronger cabinet with more
political latitude than hitherto.
In the interests of unity and sound governance, the Pohamba
cabinet might contain a few surprises.
Even those who fell out of favour with the present President
might be invited to join the new cabinet.
Together, these factors could make for a stable and smooth
transition.
On the negative side, however, there may be concern that the new
President might not grapple firmly enough with the development
challenges that lie ahead, particularly those identified in Vision
2030.
There might also be concern that the successor might not open up
the future, but that he could fall back on patronage, populism and
the past, failing to engage the past so as to open up the
future.
Much of this, however, would depend on the composition and
competencies in cabinet, as well as on the future President's
relationship with President Nujoma who would stay on as president
of the Party.
The drivers of politics are greed, grievance and growth.
How these are managed tends to determine the conflict
vulnerability of a society.
Namibia is in a transition, the outcome of which is
uncertain.
* Andre du Pisani teaches politics and philosophy at the
University of Namibia (Unam). The views expressed in this article
are his own.
All of the above can indeed be considered to have set the Congress
apart from previous congresses.Also, on this understanding, the
2004 Extraordinary Congress might in the fullness of time come to
be regarded as a defining moment of the fault lines in our body
politic.What these fault lines are, however, was less clear from
local media and the spate of analyses that followed the events of
the past weeks.Before offering an alternative view of the
Extraordinary Congress and its potential implications for our
politics, I wish to make a few general remarks to preface and
locate the events of the past weeks in a wider
context.DEFICIENCIESThe first is that political parties and their
deliberative spaces (such as congresses) exhibit a massive (though,
to be sure, a far from uniform) range of deficiencies.These
deficiencies can be seen in many different terms: as contingent and
unintended outcomes of intended actions which were readily seen as
intelligible and perhaps, even as rational (for example,
Hifikepunye Pohamba is too advanced in years, too uncharismatic,
too lethargic to become President of the country); as failures in
socialisation (a particular treacherous zone for most political
parties), as failures in cultural reproduction or in political
imagination (much in evidence at the Extraordinary Congress).While
these deficiencies do not necessarily reflect causal disagreements
or deep ideological divides in a party, they often reflect
preferences in the allocation of blame and different claims to the
idea of ensuring and perpetuating the hegemony of a party.In the
end it was this concern, ensuring and perpetuating the monopolising
legitimate authority of Swapo Party of Namibia, ensuring cultural
reproduction and perpetuating the political imagination (or lack of
it) of liberation politics and development (a much-abused word) as
appropriated by the founding President and those who commit
themselves blindly to his vision of the future, that conspired
against the two other candidates.Pohamba, from this perspective,
was rationally seen as the logical successor and torchbearer of the
vision of President Nujoma.It is also important to remember that he
pressed his claim to the presidency frequently enough in these
terms.The absence of a high profile campaign actually worked in his
favour.It reinforced the idea among participants that he was
politically the logical successor to his mentor, that he would
ensure continuity and stability, especially during the transition,
and that he would pursue the vision and priorities of the
incumbent.While such reasoning might have been anti-intellectual
(as indeed I believe it was) it carried the day.ULTIMATELY ALL
POLITICS ARE LOCALThe second general point that needs to be made is
that of the three candidates, Pohamba, enjoyed the support of, and
had access to, more influential local power brokers where it
counts; the northern Oshiwambo-speaking regions of the country.This
is particularly important, since the ability for the reciprocal
assimilation of local elites is key to the maintenance of political
stability.Moreover, the local community leaders and power brokers
themselves seem to think of this trajectory in terms of its
historical continuity.In northern Namibia (as distinct from urban
Namibia) there is a widely-held perception that links the peasantry
and the local community leaders, through traditional leaders, the
Party and the church, to the dominant class and the political
leaders of the former liberation period.Contemporary political life
in post-independent Namibia, however, does not manifest itself in a
clear structure of constituted classes, but rather acts as an
instrument of a dominant class in formation.The Hamutenya campaign,
in retrospect, was premised on the illusion of a coherent and
politically active middle class augmented by a transformative
youth, a coalition that would support technocratic leadership and
innovation.The problem with this assumption was it ignored the role
of local notables and rural communities.It also underestimated the
corrosive power of patronage and the tactical alliances that have
been entered into between the Party and the State, the economic
elites, the traders, organised labour and the rural
peasantry.Curiously it failed to recognise that Swapo is the main
party of the peasantry.Hints of a future technocratic cabinet did
not help either.This process of reciprocal assimilation is not a
recent phenomenon, but dates back to the pre-independence period.It
ensures cultural reproduction and makes for a particular political
imagination that privileges the liberation struggle and the idea of
the opportunity State.Pohamba, like President Nujoma, is seen to
provide opportunities to local communities, for he would, in all
likelihood, continue significant strands that came to characterise
the conservative modernisation of his predecessor (Swapo may be a
radical party.It is certainly not a revolutionary party).THE
POLITICS OF THE BELLYThe third dimension that is in need of closer
analysis, is the practice of the politics of the belly (a phrase
and practice that goes beyond physical corpulence), to borrow a
phrase from Jean-Francois Bayart.It is important to emphasise at
the outset that the networks that sustain and feed 'the politics of
the belly' are anchored in inequality and that such networks are
themselves producers of inequality.There is consequently no
inherent contradiction between the understanding of the State in
terms of social stratification and the internal logic of the
political entrepreneurs who engage in the politics of the belly.The
point is that the politics of the belly and the networks that feed
it capture, accumulate and partially redistribute wealth and
power.As such they are integral to the quest for political
hegemony.As soon as positions of power within the dominant party
command access to social and economic resources, the logic of
schism becomes stronger, carrying the risk of eventual political
fragmentation.This may well be one of the compelling reasons why
the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Deputy were
unceremoniously removed during the week of the Extraordinary
Congress.The realisation that a different person could determine
the allocation of resources of power, translated into the fear that
the principle of reciprocity - whether symbolic or concrete -
institutionalised by the personalization of social and political
relations within existing networks - could be under threat,
militated against the idea of more enlightened leadership
change.The issue is not just that of ensuring that the
redistribution of wealth and other resources of power would
continue, rather that the personal relationship on which
redistribution depends (which is by definition highly
non-egalitarian and hierarchical), would change, making it more
likely for social groups to become less petrified and less
acquiescent.The political repertoire would change.Development
projects, such as the railway line that is currently under
construction between Tsumeb and Oshikango on the Angolan border,
would become more depersonalised and ordinary.This, in turn, could
detract from the image of the President as the inventor and
implementer of development.MORAL CULTUREThis brings us to the next
issue, that of the moral culture within the governing party.Are
there active repositories left which condemn (or have the potential
to prevent) the excessive monopolisation and personalisation of
power? Do ordinary members of the governing party nourish the idea
of individual liberty, while at the same time, consider deep social
injustice and poverty (such as what we have in our country) as
morally and socially unacceptable? How principled is the loyalty
and trust? Have Namibians of different political ilk appropriated
the formal representations of democracy, without the substantive
moral values such as tolerance, the right to differ and freedom of
conscience, that render democracy meaningful? The need for
democracy does not arise for like-minded people.If we all agreed on
all things there would be no need for a democracy.The call for
democracy only arises where in our collective ventures we recognise
that there are and always will be differences of opinion.There is
also no need for democracy where one group or party is determined
to force the others into submitting to its will.In democracies
differences are recognised and valued.The need for democracy only
arises when it is essential for rules and procedures to be laid
down specifying that we must all act in a common way.In this last
respect, the 2004 Extraordinary Swapo Congress offered real hope,
at least at the level of procedures and form.SOME
IMPLICATIONSAgainst these observations, what implications could the
politics and outcome of the Extraordinary Congress have for the
future? Admittedly, this in a difficult, yet necessary question to
ask.The implications are bound to be mixed.On the positive side,
the party faithful had, what was for many, their first meaningful
encounter with procedural democracy.The mere fact that more than
one candidate contested for the position (irrespective of their
ethnic background, age, and gender) holds potential for
internalising the rules of the game more deeply in the
future.Leadership contests might intensify at different levels
within the Party.Notwithstanding widespread fears that the
President to-be would be a clone of the present incumbent, the
reality may be different.Pohamba may well wish to leave his own
imprint on what is likely to be a one-term presidency.By extension,
this could make for a stronger cabinet with more political latitude
than hitherto.In the interests of unity and sound governance, the
Pohamba cabinet might contain a few surprises.Even those who fell
out of favour with the present President might be invited to join
the new cabinet.Together, these factors could make for a stable and
smooth transition.On the negative side, however, there may be
concern that the new President might not grapple firmly enough with
the development challenges that lie ahead, particularly those
identified in Vision 2030.There might also be concern that the
successor might not open up the future, but that he could fall back
on patronage, populism and the past, failing to engage the past so
as to open up the future.Much of this, however, would depend on the
composition and competencies in cabinet, as well as on the future
President's relationship with President Nujoma who would stay on as
president of the Party.The drivers of politics are greed, grievance
and growth.How these are managed tends to determine the conflict
vulnerability of a society.Namibia is in a transition, the outcome
of which is uncertain.* Andre du Pisani teaches politics and
philosophy at the University of Namibia (Unam). The views expressed
in this article are his own.