What Future for SADC?
By: HENNING MELBERRECENT trends seem to suggest a shift away from strengthening of regional co-operation, a hitherto declared priority on development agendas.
Hampering factors include political differences such as the
controversy over Zimbabwe.
It has escalated into a sharp division of views also among the
member countries of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC).
It is hardly an exaggeration to state that the inability to
agree on a common approach has an almost paralysing effect.
The following analysis concentrates on socio-economic factors of
concern, which divide the region further instead of bringing it
closer together.
Strategic shift towards Nepad The New Partnership for Africa's
Development (Nepad) seems to emerge increasingly as a type of
mega-NGO to channel aid-funds into developmental projects, which at
best claim, but in reality fail to be driven, by a desire towards
enhanced regional collaboration.
The programmes and policies funded under Nepad are implemented
mainly by countries and not by regional bodies.
Hence Nepad in effect undermines rather than strengthens an
agency such as SADC (or any other regional institution).
This is a trend notwithstanding the fact that Nepad attributes
substantial relevance to regional bodies when identifying ways and
means to achieve the defined socio-economic goals.
Nepad claims that its agenda is "based on national and regional
priorities and development plans", which ought to be prepared
"through participatory processes involving the people".
So far, however, no visible signs in the SADC would indicate
that the collective (multilateral) efforts aim at a united approach
of the region in its relations with the outside world.
Nor does Nepad so far translate its noble aims into practical
steps for implementation.
The blueprint emphasises sub-regional and regional approaches
even under a separate sub heading.
It stresses "the need for African countries to pool their
resources and enhance regional development and economic integration
... to improve international competitiveness".
But the crux of the matter lies there:the emphasis on
international competitiveness comes at the expenses of
strengthening the local economy and the local people.
Instead, integration in Africa should as a priority meet the
socio-economic and environmental needs of its citizenries and not
seek to turn even more into an export platform.
Nepad claims further to enhance the provision of essential
regional goods as well as the promotion of intra-African trade and
investments, with another focus on "rationalising the institutional
framework for economic integration".
But again, such an approach neglects the local/internal in
favour of the global/external orientation.
The implementation of Nepad will hence most likely have the
adverse effect and assist in an increased outward orientation of a
regional bloc at the expenses of internal consolidation.
It is interesting to note in this context, that notwithstanding
the decisive role of South Africa within Nepad, SADC has so far
hardly acknowledged and certainly not embraced the initiative.
Divisive Free Trade Agreements The Free Trade Agreement between
the European Union and South Africa (EU-SA FTA) negotiated since
the mid-1990s, had a similarly divisive effect on the Southern
African region by entering into a preferential trade relation with
one country and thereby enhancing differences within the region
resulting from existing conflicts of interest among the national
economies.
South Africa itself, the monetary zone, the South African
Customs Union (SACU) and SADC are already not in harmony at any
time and less so given the effects of the FTA on regional economic
matters.
Hence the EU intervention adds more friction.
The new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated
between the countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
Islands (ACP States) on the one hand and the EU on the other hand
not only seek to replace the previous Cotonou Agreement by means of
sub-regional separate negotiations but also aim towards
compatibility between EU-ACP trade relations and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO).
They are hence dependent upon the settlement of the Doha
Development Agenda's controversial and yet unresolved issues.
Interestingly enough, the draft European Constitution makes no
reference to co-operation with ACP states.
It is only fair to assume that the EU enlargement shifts
interest even further away from the neighbouring continent towards
more collaboration closer to Brussels.
In addition, the negotiations by the EU aim at separate accords
with each region, and no country may negotiate in more than one
bloc.
As such, SADC is reduced to seven member countries (half of the
14 SADC states) under the EPA negotiations.
It is not far-fetched to see that there is an inbuilt conflict
between regionalism as it exists and the negotiations of new
multilateral processes.
Countries might differ over the advantages between benefits from
the continued protection of regional arrangements or the creation
of individual preferential access within other trade
agreements.
But if regionalism is considered as a problem or obstacle
towards further global harmonisation under the WTO, it stands
little chance of being a viable point of departure for
strengthening in particular the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in
the South within the global trade arrangements.
Instead, the predictable outcome of the current negotiations
under the WTO related agreements will be a shrinking of
"development space".
To avoid such in-egalitarian pseudo-partnerships, a shift in
balance from the drive to homogenize trading commitments to other
states towards granting states reasonable scope to choose
appropriate levels of national protection is required.
A development strategy would therefore have to operate in a zone
where both internal as well as external integration reinforce than
rather undermine each other.
Instead, issues of internal integration (including issues of
regional integration) have largely dropped out of the development
agenda as the gospel of the free trade paradigm dominates the
discourse.
EU and US as partners? The same limiting effects can be expected
from the Free Trade Agreement between SACU and the USA.
The SACU-US FTA seems to promise nothing different from the
US-American African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which tends
to separate and divide instead of bringing African economies and
interests closer.
The benefits from AGOA differ among African countries according
to their resources.
Ironically, within those countries having been allocated a LDC
status under AGOA (receiving additional preferential treatment),
external capital (from mainly East Asian countries) has managed to
exploit the opportunities created for supplying the US market under
preferential tax regimes with cheap textiles from these
countries.
The by and large unqualified and underpaid workforce in the
local sweatshops is hardly reaping any benefits from the super
exploitation.
Nor does the fiscus in these states, as initial investments and
running costs for operations are substantially subsidised with
public revenue instead of providing any tax income from the profits
generated.
Such recent trends indicate less rather than more regional
cooperation and integration, at least in macro-economic terms along
the official membership in such bodies like SADC.
The political and security interests might provide with
increased support by the G8 (the group of 8 most industrialised
countries of the Northern hemisphere) the strengthening of
initiatives towards closer regional collaboration in reducing armed
conflicts and securing more stability.
Such stability continues however to be perceived as regime
security, in contrast to a concept of human security.
The latter would give primacy to human rights in favour of the
citizens and not preference to the governments in power Even if
there would be achievements in this direction, the
multi-dimensionality and heterogeneity of a region like Southern
Africa is likely to persist and may eventually increase.
This does not prevent external support towards further positive
regional interdependence.
But this requires more than merely the opening up to the global
economy.
More so, it would have to re-visit matters of regional economic
collaboration and seek involvement of the majority of the African
population in these countries.
- The current initiatives by the EU and the US under the WTO
offer little to no promise to contribute to such a desirable
tendency, either in SADC or elsewhere.
* Dr Henning Melber is Research Director at The Nordic Africa
Institute in Uppsala/Sweden and has been Director of Nepru between
1992 and 2000.
It has escalated into a sharp division of views also among the
member countries of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC).It is hardly an exaggeration to state that the inability to
agree on a common approach has an almost paralysing effect.The
following analysis concentrates on socio-economic factors of
concern, which divide the region further instead of bringing it
closer together.Strategic shift towards Nepad The New Partnership
for Africa's Development (Nepad) seems to emerge increasingly as a
type of mega-NGO to channel aid-funds into developmental projects,
which at best claim, but in reality fail to be driven, by a desire
towards enhanced regional collaboration.The programmes and policies
funded under Nepad are implemented mainly by countries and not by
regional bodies.Hence Nepad in effect undermines rather than
strengthens an agency such as SADC (or any other regional
institution).This is a trend notwithstanding the fact that Nepad
attributes substantial relevance to regional bodies when
identifying ways and means to achieve the defined socio-economic
goals.Nepad claims that its agenda is "based on national and
regional priorities and development plans", which ought to be
prepared "through participatory processes involving the people".So
far, however, no visible signs in the SADC would indicate that the
collective (multilateral) efforts aim at a united approach of the
region in its relations with the outside world.Nor does Nepad so
far translate its noble aims into practical steps for
implementation.The blueprint emphasises sub-regional and regional
approaches even under a separate sub heading.It stresses "the need
for African countries to pool their resources and enhance regional
development and economic integration ... to improve international
competitiveness".But the crux of the matter lies there:the emphasis
on international competitiveness comes at the expenses of
strengthening the local economy and the local people.Instead,
integration in Africa should as a priority meet the socio-economic
and environmental needs of its citizenries and not seek to turn
even more into an export platform.Nepad claims further to enhance
the provision of essential regional goods as well as the promotion
of intra-African trade and investments, with another focus on
"rationalising the institutional framework for economic
integration".But again, such an approach neglects the
local/internal in favour of the global/external orientation.The
implementation of Nepad will hence most likely have the adverse
effect and assist in an increased outward orientation of a regional
bloc at the expenses of internal consolidation.It is interesting to
note in this context, that notwithstanding the decisive role of
South Africa within Nepad, SADC has so far hardly acknowledged and
certainly not embraced the initiative. Divisive Free Trade
Agreements The Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and
South Africa (EU-SA FTA) negotiated since the mid-1990s, had a
similarly divisive effect on the Southern African region by
entering into a preferential trade relation with one country and
thereby enhancing differences within the region resulting from
existing conflicts of interest among the national economies.South
Africa itself, the monetary zone, the South African Customs Union
(SACU) and SADC are already not in harmony at any time and less so
given the effects of the FTA on regional economic matters.Hence the
EU intervention adds more friction.The new Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between the countries in Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific Islands (ACP States) on the one hand and
the EU on the other hand not only seek to replace the previous
Cotonou Agreement by means of sub-regional separate negotiations
but also aim towards compatibility between EU-ACP trade relations
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).They are hence dependent
upon the settlement of the Doha Development Agenda's controversial
and yet unresolved issues.Interestingly enough, the draft European
Constitution makes no reference to co-operation with ACP states.It
is only fair to assume that the EU enlargement shifts interest even
further away from the neighbouring continent towards more
collaboration closer to Brussels.In addition, the negotiations by
the EU aim at separate accords with each region, and no country may
negotiate in more than one bloc.As such, SADC is reduced to seven
member countries (half of the 14 SADC states) under the EPA
negotiations.It is not far-fetched to see that there is an inbuilt
conflict between regionalism as it exists and the negotiations of
new multilateral processes.Countries might differ over the
advantages between benefits from the continued protection of
regional arrangements or the creation of individual preferential
access within other trade agreements.But if regionalism is
considered as a problem or obstacle towards further global
harmonisation under the WTO, it stands little chance of being a
viable point of departure for strengthening in particular the Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) in the South within the global trade
arrangements.Instead, the predictable outcome of the current
negotiations under the WTO related agreements will be a shrinking
of "development space".To avoid such in-egalitarian
pseudo-partnerships, a shift in balance from the drive to
homogenize trading commitments to other states towards granting
states reasonable scope to choose appropriate levels of national
protection is required.A development strategy would therefore have
to operate in a zone where both internal as well as external
integration reinforce than rather undermine each other.Instead,
issues of internal integration (including issues of regional
integration) have largely dropped out of the development agenda as
the gospel of the free trade paradigm dominates the discourse.EU
and US as partners? The same limiting effects can be expected from
the Free Trade Agreement between SACU and the USA.The SACU-US FTA
seems to promise nothing different from the US-American African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which tends to separate and
divide instead of bringing African economies and interests
closer.The benefits from AGOA differ among African countries
according to their resources.Ironically, within those countries
having been allocated a LDC status under AGOA (receiving additional
preferential treatment), external capital (from mainly East Asian
countries) has managed to exploit the opportunities created for
supplying the US market under preferential tax regimes with cheap
textiles from these countries.The by and large unqualified and
underpaid workforce in the local sweatshops is hardly reaping any
benefits from the super exploitation.Nor does the fiscus in these
states, as initial investments and running costs for operations are
substantially subsidised with public revenue instead of providing
any tax income from the profits generated.Such recent trends
indicate less rather than more regional cooperation and
integration, at least in macro-economic terms along the official
membership in such bodies like SADC.The political and security
interests might provide with increased support by the G8 (the group
of 8 most industrialised countries of the Northern hemisphere) the
strengthening of initiatives towards closer regional collaboration
in reducing armed conflicts and securing more stability.Such
stability continues however to be perceived as regime security, in
contrast to a concept of human security.The latter would give
primacy to human rights in favour of the citizens and not
preference to the governments in power Even if there would be
achievements in this direction, the multi-dimensionality and
heterogeneity of a region like Southern Africa is likely to persist
and may eventually increase.This does not prevent external support
towards further positive regional interdependence.But this requires
more than merely the opening up to the global economy.More so, it
would have to re-visit matters of regional economic collaboration
and seek involvement of the majority of the African population in
these countries.- The current initiatives by the EU and the US
under the WTO offer little to no promise to contribute to such a
desirable tendency, either in SADC or elsewhere.* Dr Henning Melber
is Research Director at The Nordic Africa Institute in
Uppsala/Sweden and has been Director of Nepru between 1992 and
2000.