The Shia Showdown
By: GWYNNE DYERTHE claims and counter-claims make it hard to discern the strategies behind the showdown in Najaf, and the language that is used blurs the situation even more.
US military spokesmen, for example, always call the young men who
are defending the rebel Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr "anti-Iraqi
forces," although not one in a hundred of them has ever been
outside Iraq.
But you can guess why the US authorities in Iraq chose this
moment to try to eliminate Sadr and his al-Mahdi militia.
From the start, the biggest obstacle to the creation of a
compliant, pro-American regime in Iraq has been the fact that the
Shias, who make up about 60 percent of Iraq's population, could
elect a majority government that could and probably would defy US
wishes if they voted as a bloc.
Moreover, senior Shia clerics command great respect in the
community, making it much likelier that the Shia would indeed vote
en bloc.
So elections were too risky.
Retired general Jay Garner, the original choice as US pro-consul
in Iraq, was dismissed after a month because he called for early
elections in Iraq: "The night after I got to Baghdad, (Defence
Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld called me and told me he was appointing
Paul Bremer as the presidential envoy...The announcement...was
somewhat abrupt."
Rumsfeld was worried that an elected Iraqi government would
resist mass privatisation of the economy, but he was equally
worried that such a government would be Shia-dominated, and insist
on an Islamic state.
The problem was compounded by the fact that Washington's
favourite ayatollah, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, was killed the day after
Baghdad fell.
Khoei had become a personal friend of British Prime Minister
Tony Blair during his long exile in London, and had strong US
backing.
But a mob hacked him to death in the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf on
10 April, 2003, the day after he arrived, leaving the field open to
less pro-American rivals.
One was Iraq's current senior ayatollah, Ali al-Sistani, an
Iranian-born scholar who issued a fatwa early in last year's US
invasion calling on all Muslims to fight the invading infidel
forces.
His principal rival for the loyalty of Iraqi Shias was Ayatollah
Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, an Iraqi-born cleric who had spent more
than twenty years in exile in Iran after backing that country's
Islamic regime against Iraq in the 1980-88 war.
Hakim was willing to cooperate with the US occupiers in the hope
that an election would ultimately give the Shias power, but he was
killed by a huge car bomb outside the Imam Ali shrine on 29 August,
2003.
That left only the recalcitrant Sistani -- and the young
firebrand Moqtada al-Sadr.
At 30, Sadr is less than half the age of his rival, and he lacks
a rigorous education in Islamic law, but he is the son of a revered
former grand ayatollah who was murdered by Saddam Hussein's regime
in 1999 and he has a strong following among the urban poor.
Last March Paul Bremer made a deal with Sistani.
The ayatollah guaranteed that the Shia would remain quiet this
year (until George W. Bush's re-election bid in the US is safely
past, in other words), in return for free elections in Iraq early
next year.
And then, seeking to insure against the risk that Sadr would try
to spoil the deal, Bremer did something very foolish: he attacked
Sadr directly.
In early April the US occupation authorities closed down Sadr's
newspaper, a 10,000-circulation weekly that stridently condemned
the occupation but had little influence, and issued an arrest
warrant charging Sadr with Khoei's murder.
Sadr took his militia to the sacred city of Najaf and defied the
Americans to come and get him.
Impoverished young Shias rose in revolt in east Baghdad and the
cities of the south, and hundreds died before the US command
negotiated a truce.
By then, Moqtada al-Sadr was famous across Iraq and the whole
Muslim world.
US troops could have fought their way into Najaf, violated the
Imam Ali mosque and killed Sadr if they were willing to pay the
price, and the price in American lives would not even be great:
American firepower, equipment and training mean that a hundred
young Shia men die in the fighting for every American who is
killed.
But the POLITICAL price would have been huge, so the US forces
were called off in May.
Why are they attacking again now? Whatever the truth about the
incident that re-started the fighting, it's clearly an American
choice to go for broke against Sadr.
US forces were under no compulsion to escalate as they have
done, and the newly appointed Iraqi "transitional government" could
not have forced them to.
The likely answer is that the sudden removal of Sistani from the
scene (he flew to London for heart treatment two weeks ago) has
made Sadr too powerful, and too dangerous to the "transitional
government," to be left alive.
There are to be no witnesses this time: the few journalists in
Najaf have been ordered to leave on pain of arrest.
But if this ends in a last stand and a massacre of the al-Mahdi
militia in the most sacred site in the Shia world, possibly doing
serious damage to the Imam Ali mosque itself, the long-term cost to
the United States will far outweigh any possible gains.
The logic of the strategy is still very hard to follow.
* Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent journalist whose
articles are published in 45 countries.
But you can guess why the US authorities in Iraq chose this moment
to try to eliminate Sadr and his al-Mahdi militia.From the start,
the biggest obstacle to the creation of a compliant, pro-American
regime in Iraq has been the fact that the Shias, who make up about
60 percent of Iraq's population, could elect a majority government
that could and probably would defy US wishes if they voted as a
bloc.Moreover, senior Shia clerics command great respect in the
community, making it much likelier that the Shia would indeed vote
en bloc.So elections were too risky.Retired general Jay Garner, the
original choice as US pro-consul in Iraq, was dismissed after a
month because he called for early elections in Iraq: "The night
after I got to Baghdad, (Defence Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld called
me and told me he was appointing Paul Bremer as the presidential
envoy...The announcement...was somewhat abrupt."Rumsfeld was
worried that an elected Iraqi government would resist mass
privatisation of the economy, but he was equally worried that such
a government would be Shia-dominated, and insist on an Islamic
state.The problem was compounded by the fact that Washington's
favourite ayatollah, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, was killed the day after
Baghdad fell.Khoei had become a personal friend of British Prime
Minister Tony Blair during his long exile in London, and had strong
US backing.But a mob hacked him to death in the Imam Ali mosque in
Najaf on 10 April, 2003, the day after he arrived, leaving the
field open to less pro-American rivals.One was Iraq's current
senior ayatollah, Ali al-Sistani, an Iranian-born scholar who
issued a fatwa early in last year's US invasion calling on all
Muslims to fight the invading infidel forces.His principal rival
for the loyalty of Iraqi Shias was Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr
al-Hakim, an Iraqi-born cleric who had spent more than twenty years
in exile in Iran after backing that country's Islamic regime
against Iraq in the 1980-88 war.Hakim was willing to cooperate with
the US occupiers in the hope that an election would ultimately give
the Shias power, but he was killed by a huge car bomb outside the
Imam Ali shrine on 29 August, 2003.That left only the recalcitrant
Sistani -- and the young firebrand Moqtada al-Sadr.At 30, Sadr is
less than half the age of his rival, and he lacks a rigorous
education in Islamic law, but he is the son of a revered former
grand ayatollah who was murdered by Saddam Hussein's regime in 1999
and he has a strong following among the urban poor.Last March Paul
Bremer made a deal with Sistani.The ayatollah guaranteed that the
Shia would remain quiet this year (until George W. Bush's
re-election bid in the US is safely past, in other words), in
return for free elections in Iraq early next year.And then, seeking
to insure against the risk that Sadr would try to spoil the deal,
Bremer did something very foolish: he attacked Sadr directly.In
early April the US occupation authorities closed down Sadr's
newspaper, a 10,000-circulation weekly that stridently condemned
the occupation but had little influence, and issued an arrest
warrant charging Sadr with Khoei's murder.Sadr took his militia to
the sacred city of Najaf and defied the Americans to come and get
him.Impoverished young Shias rose in revolt in east Baghdad and the
cities of the south, and hundreds died before the US command
negotiated a truce.By then, Moqtada al-Sadr was famous across Iraq
and the whole Muslim world.US troops could have fought their way
into Najaf, violated the Imam Ali mosque and killed Sadr if they
were willing to pay the price, and the price in American lives
would not even be great: American firepower, equipment and training
mean that a hundred young Shia men die in the fighting for every
American who is killed.But the POLITICAL price would have been
huge, so the US forces were called off in May.Why are they
attacking again now? Whatever the truth about the incident that
re-started the fighting, it's clearly an American choice to go for
broke against Sadr.US forces were under no compulsion to escalate
as they have done, and the newly appointed Iraqi "transitional
government" could not have forced them to.The likely answer is that
the sudden removal of Sistani from the scene (he flew to London for
heart treatment two weeks ago) has made Sadr too powerful, and too
dangerous to the "transitional government," to be left alive.There
are to be no witnesses this time: the few journalists in Najaf have
been ordered to leave on pain of arrest.But if this ends in a last
stand and a massacre of the al-Mahdi militia in the most sacred
site in the Shia world, possibly doing serious damage to the Imam
Ali mosque itself, the long-term cost to the United States will far
outweigh any possible gains.The logic of the strategy is still very
hard to follow.* Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent
journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.