Are Bush and Sharon Making History, or Pushing a Hoax?
By: RAMI G KHOURIWASHINGTON, DC - It's more than the protesting Jordanian king overflying Washington instead of stopping there as planned, and more than strong criticism from Egypt, one of the top global recipients of US aid.
Editor's Note: An Arab commentator says that a close reading of
President's Bush's recent announced support for Israel's plan for
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip reveals little that both Palestinian
and Israeli negotiators didn't already take for granted - as well
as some hopeful signs for peace. But Bush's style and actions may
speak louder to the Arab world.
The bombshell dropped by George W Bush and Ariel Sharon on April
14 continues to send shock waves throughout the Arab world.
President Bush's support for the Israeli Prime Minister's plan
to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip and four small Israeli
settlements in the northern West Bank simultaneously put the United
States on record as supporting the Israeli position on two key
Palestinian-Israeli peace-making issues:Israel's retention of some
large settlements it has built on Palestinian lands occupied in
1967, and rejection of Palestinian refugees "right of return" to
Israel proper.
The Arab world is incensed - largely because Washington acted
unilaterally on such pivotal issues.
Most of the criticism is appropriate, but more for reasons of
style than substance.
What April 14 really revealed is, again, how vulnerable and
impotent the Palestinians and Arabs are today in the face of
American and Israeli leaders who do not hesitate to use military
force or political dictates to achieve their objectives.
In fact, a close reading of the American text of April 14
reveals that Bush merely stated in public and gave official
American support to long-standing assumptions held by both sides in
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations:first, that only a symbolic return
of some Palestinian refugees to Israel proper would occur, while
the majority would repatriate or settle elsewhere and receive
compensatory economic and political rights; and second, that the
large Israeli settlement towns along the former border between
Israel and the West Bank, such as Maale Adumim, Ariel, and Givat
Zeev, would be permanently incorporated into Israel in exchange for
territory of equal value that Israel would cede to the new
Palestinian state.
These assumptions were first articulated in the parameters that
President Clinton issued in late 2000, after the failure of the
Camp David negotiations (parameters which Israeli and Palestinian
leaders accepted, with some reservations).
The second potentially important point in the US statement - and
future actions will determine if it is merely a hoax - is that it
re-iterates and leaves open for direct negotiations almost all the
issues that Palestinians and Arabs deem important.
The statement reaffirms the central role of the "road map" and
reminds both parties of their obligations under it.
It says that final borders must be negotiated by the parties in
accordance with UN resolutions 242 and 338, with any changes to the
1949 armistice lines to be "mutually agreed" upon.
It re-iterates US support for "the establishment of a
Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and
independent," and reminds Israel of its obligations to freeze
settlements, remove unauthorised outposts and ease restrictions on
movement of Palestinians.
Washington also said the separation barrier Israel is building
should be for security rather than political purposes, temporary
rather than permanent, and should not prejudice any final status
issues, including final borders.
The text of the US position reflects carefully crafted positions
that give all parties something useful and important:Israel and
Sharon get Washington's somewhat vague support on the key issues of
settlements and refugees, and the Palestinians get reaffirmations
that final status agreements will be negotiated between
Palestinians and Israelis.
Bush, in turn, gets an anticipated boost from pro-Israeli voters
in the 2004 US presidential elections.
But there are three different dimensions to this contentious
development.
The first is the formal text itself.
The second is the unspoken political assumptions behind the
text, which are widely known to all but have never been explicitly
issued as a US position.
The third, and most important in Arab eyes, is the perception
that Washington, in congruence with Israel, has unilaterally
decided on the key final status issues of settlements, frontiers
and refugees, and thus has abandoned a generation's commitment
(since 1967) to achieving a permanent Arab-Israeli peace via direct
negotiations by the parties themselves.
Palestinians, Arabs and most other people around the world
interpret this development as a re-affirmation of long-standing
Israeli colonial designs to retain much of the occupied West Bank
and Jerusalem, and also of relatively recent American neo-colonial
tendencies most evident in aggressive US policies in Iraq and
Palestine.
The actual text is not very decisive on this argument.
It will be interpreted in different ways, according to the
reader's preconceived perceptions of the United States as either a
noble or a predatory actor in the Middle East.
The dynamics of text, the unspoken assumptions and power
balances behind it and its perception in the region are all moving
in slightly different directions these days.
The practical follow-up and implementation by Israel, the United
States and the Palestinians will soon reveal if this is a historic
opportunity for progress toward peace, or simply another desperate
move by politicians doomed to keep fighting military wars because
they are unable to generate fair, diplomatic solutions.
- Pacific News Service PNS contributor Rami G.
Khouri (rgskhouri@hotmail.com) is a political scientist and
executive editor of the Daily Star in Beirut, Lebanon.
The bombshell dropped by George W Bush and Ariel Sharon on April 14
continues to send shock waves throughout the Arab world.President
Bush's support for the Israeli Prime Minister's plan to
unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip and four small Israeli
settlements in the northern West Bank simultaneously put the United
States on record as supporting the Israeli position on two key
Palestinian-Israeli peace-making issues:Israel's retention of some
large settlements it has built on Palestinian lands occupied in
1967, and rejection of Palestinian refugees "right of return" to
Israel proper.The Arab world is incensed - largely because
Washington acted unilaterally on such pivotal issues.Most of the
criticism is appropriate, but more for reasons of style than
substance.What April 14 really revealed is, again, how vulnerable
and impotent the Palestinians and Arabs are today in the face of
American and Israeli leaders who do not hesitate to use military
force or political dictates to achieve their objectives.In fact, a
close reading of the American text of April 14 reveals that Bush
merely stated in public and gave official American support to
long-standing assumptions held by both sides in Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations:first, that only a symbolic return of some Palestinian
refugees to Israel proper would occur, while the majority would
repatriate or settle elsewhere and receive compensatory economic
and political rights; and second, that the large Israeli settlement
towns along the former border between Israel and the West Bank,
such as Maale Adumim, Ariel, and Givat Zeev, would be permanently
incorporated into Israel in exchange for territory of equal value
that Israel would cede to the new Palestinian state.These
assumptions were first articulated in the parameters that President
Clinton issued in late 2000, after the failure of the Camp David
negotiations (parameters which Israeli and Palestinian leaders
accepted, with some reservations).The second potentially important
point in the US statement - and future actions will determine if it
is merely a hoax - is that it re-iterates and leaves open for
direct negotiations almost all the issues that Palestinians and
Arabs deem important.The statement reaffirms the central role of
the "road map" and reminds both parties of their obligations under
it.It says that final borders must be negotiated by the parties in
accordance with UN resolutions 242 and 338, with any changes to the
1949 armistice lines to be "mutually agreed" upon.It re-iterates US
support for "the establishment of a Palestinian state that is
viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent," and reminds Israel
of its obligations to freeze settlements, remove unauthorised
outposts and ease restrictions on movement of
Palestinians.Washington also said the separation barrier Israel is
building should be for security rather than political purposes,
temporary rather than permanent, and should not prejudice any final
status issues, including final borders.The text of the US position
reflects carefully crafted positions that give all parties
something useful and important:Israel and Sharon get Washington's
somewhat vague support on the key issues of settlements and
refugees, and the Palestinians get reaffirmations that final status
agreements will be negotiated between Palestinians and
Israelis.Bush, in turn, gets an anticipated boost from pro-Israeli
voters in the 2004 US presidential elections.But there are three
different dimensions to this contentious development.The first is
the formal text itself.The second is the unspoken political
assumptions behind the text, which are widely known to all but have
never been explicitly issued as a US position.The third, and most
important in Arab eyes, is the perception that Washington, in
congruence with Israel, has unilaterally decided on the key final
status issues of settlements, frontiers and refugees, and thus has
abandoned a generation's commitment (since 1967) to achieving a
permanent Arab-Israeli peace via direct negotiations by the parties
themselves.Palestinians, Arabs and most other people around the
world interpret this development as a re-affirmation of
long-standing Israeli colonial designs to retain much of the
occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, and also of relatively recent
American neo-colonial tendencies most evident in aggressive US
policies in Iraq and Palestine.The actual text is not very decisive
on this argument.It will be interpreted in different ways,
according to the reader's preconceived perceptions of the United
States as either a noble or a predatory actor in the Middle
East.The dynamics of text, the unspoken assumptions and power
balances behind it and its perception in the region are all moving
in slightly different directions these days.The practical follow-up
and implementation by Israel, the United States and the
Palestinians will soon reveal if this is a historic opportunity for
progress toward peace, or simply another desperate move by
politicians doomed to keep fighting military wars because they are
unable to generate fair, diplomatic solutions.- Pacific News
Service PNS contributor Rami G.Khouri (rgskhouri@hotmail.com) is a
political scientist and executive editor of the Daily Star in
Beirut, Lebanon.