The process of national healing and reconciliation is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still polarised.

In addition, without also addressing past crimes, corruption, marginalisation and poverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation can be achieved."

This insight was presented in the Kenya mission report of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

It was submitted by the APRM panel of eminent persons to the continent's Heads of State gathered at the Summit of the African Union in July 2006.

One and a half years later, Kenyan society was traumatised by the worst degree of violence since Independence and its people were more divided than ever before.

The (allegedly orchestrated) civil war-like situation erupted over disputed election results.

It brought to light that beyond the surface of a seemingly peaceful society deep-rooted antagonisms could be mobilised to unleash blind hatred and destruction of property and lives among people who were living in hitherto relative peace with one other.

In such circumstances socio-political stability assumed was treacherous, fragile, and prone to easy manipulation.

Many societies on the continent are confronted with similar challenges.

Since the mid-1990s national reconciliation initiatives emerged in a series of African countries.

These were notably inspired by the widely-praised Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, which symbolised the country's collective effort to come to terms with a past still dominating the present with lasting impact also for its future.

Despite all its limitations the TRC was widely perceived as an encouraging initiative and lesson to bring the skeletons out of the closet and to deal with the lasting effects of violence and counter-violence in a public way.

Far from solving structurally-rooted historical legacies and their daily impacts on the life of ordinary citizens, nor able to end discrimination or to bring to task many of the perpetrators, it cast the spotlight on the need to address history in the present.

Similar initiatives were undertaken in other war-torn societies marred by organised repression and forms of mass violence, causing festering wounds and scars among the people.

Notably so, the governments of two former settler societies in Southern Africa did not seek public debates and transitional forms of justice and reconciliation.

Zimbabwe and Namibia achieved their Independence through anti-colonial struggle by liberation movements.

In both cases the final defeat of colonialism was not brought through the barrel of a gun but subsequent agreements between conflicting parties forcontrolled change.

These provided a transitional framework limiting the space for the redistribution of wealth and the transformation of the societies.

As a result of negotiated decolonisation, the liberation movements Zanu and Swapo were elected as legitimate governments and have been in political power and control over the state bureaucracy since 1980 and 1990 respectively.

In contrast to South Africa's ANC, Zimbabwean and Namibian political leadership did not pursue something similar to the TRC.

Instead, they proclaimed national reconciliation as a pragmatic agreement becoming effective with Independence.

This policy declared to leave the past behind without public debate for remembrance and conscious dialogue over the injustices committed (though selective reference to colonial crimes is applied when needed and also commemorated as part of the liberation gospel).

In both societies the justification for casting this kind of official smokescreen over the colonial past was rooted to some extent in the argument that the repressive machinery of the colonial occupation was staffed and executed by many who at the dawn of Independence could no longer be held accountable.

Either because of a large-scale amnesty declared for opponents on all sides of the conflict, or because some of the worst abusers of human rights had retreated to their British or South African countries of origin.

National reconciliation was hence defined as closing the colonial chapter without dealing with and seeking justice for crimes committed by means of institutionalised hearings or other established forms of coming to terms with the past.

The cleansing process, which to some extent was initiated and implemented in the South African TRC, remained conspicuously absent.

Not so, however, the collective blame attributed to colonialism for all subsequent failures in post-independence nation building and re-structuring of the societies, which beyond some truly relevant aspects came often as handy excuse to face (self-)criticism and evade responsibility when failing in terms of "good governance".

Such a seemingly pragmatic approach implicitly and quietly at the same time denied the need and aborted the opportunity to deal with failures in the ranks of the liberation movements.

This was never the main issue in the TRC, but was brought to the fore when the excesses of the Apartheid regime were explored and laid open.

Even though the degree of self-critical examination of human rights violations within the ANC was limited it was nevertheless made an issue for which even Nelson Mandela offered an apology.

Imprisoned since the early 1960s for almost three decades, 'Madiba' as charismatic leader and moral role model could apologise for failures in the exiled ANC for which he was obviously not personally responsible, and perhaps even unaware.

In contrast, both Robert Mugabe and Sam Nujoma were active leaders in exile, deeply involved in internal power struggles and not only an integral part of the authoritarian hierarchy but also its personification.

Ultimately in charge of the command and obey structures dominating their movements, they were at least to some degree individually accountable for the abuses and malpractices within the ranks of the liberation movement.

As Heads of State they were not inclined to address such issues.

Instead, the equation promoted was that the injustices of the past on all sides would be put to rest.

By doing so, however, the liberation movements sacrificed the moral high ground they had been able to occupy vis-à-vis the colonial oppressive regimes.

Their own failures remained unfinished business and left festering wounds within the new post-colonial society.

The dominant mindsets emerging with Independence represented more of an old order than a new one and showed in terms of the political cultures the limits to liberation.

In Zimbabwe, the violent practices within and between the liberation movements escalated soon after Independence in organised massacres in Matabeleland (the western part of Zimbabwe occupied mostly by Ndebele-speakers considered to be in their majority supporters to the Joshua Nkomo-led Zapu, competing with Zanu for power).

Between early 1983 and late 1986, about 20 000 people died through acts of barbarism carried out by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army.

Although known and reported at the time, the massacres were largely ignored.

Described by Mugabe as Gukurahundi ("the rain that washes away the chaff.."), this constituted a defining moment for his regime.

Since then, the openly violent character of Mugabe's rule has drawn worldwide attention.

Notably, it only became a concern for the international community when the so-called fast track land reform dispossessed the majority of the commercial farmers and portrayed the conflict (misleadingly so) as one between a white settler minority and the government.

This suggests a moral selectivity in Western perceptions, which the populist rhetoric of the despotic regime managed to exploit.

As part of the Namibian Independence process, several hundred members of Swapo in exile, who were accused of being South African agents, were released and repatriated in mid-1989.

Known as "ex-detainees", they shared their plight with the Namibian public at home.

An estimated several thousand of them were since the early 1980s imprisoned, tortured, raped, and held in dungeons in Southern Angolan camps.

Many did not survive the ordeal others remained missing.

Ever since their return, the ex-detainees asked for rehabilitation and an apology by Swapo for the human rights violations committed.

But the liberation movement in power has ever since applied a policy of denial or refused compliance with the argument that this would open wounds and thereby put peace and stability at risk.

In return, Swapo argued, the atrocities by the South African regime and its local collaborators would need also to be scrutinised.

Instead, similar to the official narratives cultivated by Zanu in Zimbabwe, Swapo commenced a "nation building project" guided by what has been termed "patriotic history", which cultivates the gospel of an organisation and its leaders being the morally impeccable liberator of the people.

In both cases the hegemonic role of the former liberation movement in political power allowed to execute also the power of definition over the national interest.

But the moment this political and ideological hegemony starts deteriorating, the government fails to maintain control over the one-dimensional collective identity constructed and imposed earlier.

The emergence of the MDC as a meaningful opposition in Zimbabwe shows that the liberation gospel was increasingly faced with an expiry date.

The coerced legitimacy of the government has eroded, provoking increased intimidation, a growing culture of fear and ultimately rule based on sheer state terror.

As is known from history, sooner or later such dictatorial regimes come to an end through the same popular movements intimidated and oppressed so long.

In Namibia, an opposition has emerged towards the end of 2007 from within the belly of the beast.

Former high-ranking Swapo officials formed the RDP, which tries to challenge the so far undisputed dominance of the former liberation movement.

The next presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for the end of 2009, could result in Swapo's loss of a two third majority in parliament (and hence the absolute control over the country's political and legal decision making process).

Nervous reactions mount.

Leading political office bearers in the Namibian government warn of a Kenyan-type situation and blame the new opposition of fuelling ethnic rivalries.

This is an argument which relies on a culture of fear rather than seeking reconciliation.

Leaders of the Namibian Lutheran churches have responded to the growing polarisation by means of a pastoral letter read out during the sermons on 23 March 2008 and published thereafter.

In the light of violence erupting between the two main rival parties triggered off by a local election campaign, the four bishops of the three churches expressed fear that the country was moving backwards in terms of freedom and democracy.

The bishops remind us that, "political opponents are not enemies, but participants in a democratic set-up."

This is the first time since Independence that the church comments on the politics in the country in such a form.

While alarm bells ring, Namibians still have the opportunity to learn from the sad lessons in Kenya and elsewhere - not least in neighbouring Zimbabwe, which in many respects is so much closer to home.

* Henning Melber joined Swapo in 1974.

He is the Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjoeld Foundation in Uppsala/Sweden.

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